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Abstract 
A growing body of literature has attempted to determine the market value of a dollar of 
imputation credits (theta). By observing the market prices of securities around the ex-dividend date, 
these studies have consistently estimated that theta is significant and positive. Another subset of 
literature however, has consistently found that imputation credits do not affect a firm’s cost of capital, 
and are not capitalised into stock prices. These conflicting results provide a puzzle within the 
literature. We theorise, and then empirically show, that the values of theta observed in prices around 
the ex-dividend date are inflated upwards by the activity of short-term traders and arbitrageurs. Once 
we exclude their activity from our analysis, we use a considerable sample of 200,000 observations, to 
show that the market value of imputation credits is insignificantly different from zero. These results 
provide us with evidence that, consistent with the cost-of-capital literature, long-term providers of 
equity place no value on imputation credits. Our results therefore act to bridge the gap between these 
two areas of research, and solve the puzzle that exists within the literature. 
The fact that these imputation credits are priced into futures contracts at a value far below 
their face value also raises the question: are domestic investors able to exploit this low value by 
simultaneously entering into two opposing positions – a long position in the company’s stock, and a 
short position in a futures contract to sell the stock after the ex-dividend date – and successfully 
generate arbitrage profits? We find that this dividend-capturing arbitrage strategy has been able to 
consistently produce significant, abnormal returns over our 19 year sample period. We find that even 
after incorporating explicit transaction costs and collateral requirements, a small domestic investor is 
able to generate between 0.86% and 2.83% monthly abnormal returns with the top 10 percent of 
profitable observations in financial year 2014. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis is comprised of two main objectives. The first is to provide an accurate estimate of 
the market value of imputation credits. We use an iteration of the costly no-arbitrage framework 
developed in Cannavan, Finn and Gray (2004) (CFG) to determine what influence, if any, short-term 
traders and dividend-capturers have on implied values of imputation credits in futures prices
1
. We 
then attempt to tease out the activity of this type of investor in order to accurately estimate the value 
placed on a dollar of imputation credits by long-term providers of equity.  
The second objective is to evaluate the profitability of a dividend-stripping arbitrage strategy, 
from the perspective of a domestic investor. The trading strategy attempts to exploit the fact that 
imputation credits are priced into futures contracts far below their face value
2
, in order to generate 
arbitrage profits. The strategy involves taking a short position in a futures contract expiring ex-
dividend, and a long position in the contract’s underlying shares; allowing the domestic investor to 
undertake a fully hedged and riskless position, while pocketing the unvalued portion of the dividend 
and imputation credit, less any transaction and borrowing costs.  
1.1. Institutional Background 
Australia has operated a full imputation tax system since 1986 for the purpose of partially 
eliminating the double taxation present in a classical tax system
3
. It does this by allowing companies 
to generate imputation credits equal to the amount of company tax paid on their earnings. When after 
tax profits are paid out, a company’s shareholders receive the usual cash component, along with the 
associated imputation credits that were generated – the sum of which is known as the gross dividend. 
The entire gross dividend contributes to the investor’s taxable income, however the franking credit 
can be used to offset, or impute, any domestic tax obligations that the investor is liable for at the end 
                                                     
1
 Cannavan, Finn and Gray (2004) will henceforth be referred to as CFG. 
2
 See Twite and Wood (1997), Cannavan, Finn and Gray (2004), Strategic Finance Group (SFG) (2013b) and 
Cannavan (2013) 
3
 Under a classical tax system, dividends are taxed at both the corporation and shareholder level. 
2 
 
of the financial year
4
. This acts to eliminate the double taxation present in a classical tax system, and 
results in shareholders receiving the company’s before tax earnings, less their own marginal tax rate. 
These franking credits therefore have value; but only to the domestic investors who can redeem them. 
However, the market value placed on a dollar of franking credits, often referred to as theta 
(𝜙), may not be determined by a domestic investor. In the same way that the prices of all goods and 
services in an economy are determined by the marginal buyer and seller, the value of franking credits 
priced into financial securities is determined by the marginal investor. As a small open economy, 
Australia’s cost of capital is set by the world rate (Officer, 1988), and the marginal investor is likely 
to be foreign (Twite and Wood, 1997; CFG). If this is the case, and the imputation system is used as 
intended – where only domestic investors derive value from imputation credits – the market value of 
these credits should equal to zero.  
Understanding who the marginal investor is and what value they place on imputation credits 
is an integral component of the equity valuation process. Officer (1994) demonstrates how the value 
of theta is incorporated into the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) model, and how varying 
estimates of theta can have a drastic effect on estimates of firm value. Estimates of theta are used even 
more directly in heavily regulated industries – such as the market for wholesale electricity and gas – 
where regulators are responsible for setting the prices that can be charged by regulated firms. These 
prices are determined by analysing the level of revenue required by a firm to provide an appropriate 
return to their shareholders. This appropriate level of return – and its associated pricing – is calculated 
using a cost of capital model that directly incorporates an estimate of theta
5
. As a result, producing an 
accurate estimate of theta is an important and consequential exercise. 
                                                     
4
 For a thorough explanation of the dividend imputation system, including examples of its use, refer to Handley 
and Maheswaran (2008). 
5
 An example of this is the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) which is responsible for regulating the wholesale 
electricity and gas market in Australia. The regulator currently uses a theta estimate of 0.35 that was originally 
produced in SFG (2011), and then again in SFG (2013a). 
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1.2. Background Literature 
A wide array of literature has emerged trying to determine the market value of Australian 
imputation credits. Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) demonstrate that in order for no arbitrage 
opportunities to exist the marginal investor should be indifferent between purchasing a stock cum-
dividend (including upcoming dividend) or ex-dividend (excluding the upcoming dividend). 
Therefore, with homogeneous taxation, the ex-dividend day share price drop-off should equal the size 
of the dividend, less any transaction costs (Kalay, 1982). This costly no-arbitrage framework has been 
modified to include the value of imputation credits and applied to the Australian market (Hathaway 
and Officer, 1992; Brown and Clarke, 1993). Due to the homogenous taxation of dividends and short-
term capital gains
6
 in Australia, this model can be used to observe a stock’s ex-day drop-off, and then 
infer the value placed on dividends and franking credits by the market. 
These studies have yielded mixed results
7
 (Gellard, Mero and Vo, 2013). The variance in 
results can partially be explained by changes in regulation over the years, sensitivity to sample 
selection and outliers (McKenzie and Partington, 2010), as well as general issues related to dividend 
drop-off studies. As stated by CFG, drop-off studies suffer from four issues. First, noise in security 
prices result in considerable sampling error and fluctuations in estimates. Second, both the value of 
franking credits and dividends are measured simultaneously, and require estimating the capitalized 
value of dividends, which again leads to significant sampling error. Third, the estimation approach 
typically assumes the value of franking credits is constant across time period and companies. Finally, 
market microstructure effects, such as the existence of a bid-ask spread (Frank and Jagannathan, 
1998) and discrete tick multiples for stock prices (Bali and Hite, 1998), can result in drop-off ratios 
less than unity, regardless of the effect of taxation and imputation credits. 
However, using a similar no-arbitrage framework, the value of imputation credits can be 
estimated by observing the simultaneous prices of futures contracts and their underlying shares (Twite 
and Wood, 1997; McDonald, 2001; CFG; Cummings and Frino, 2008). This method mitigates most of 
                                                     
6
 That is, capital gains on asset held less than 12 months. 
7
 Refer to Table 2 in section 3.2 for a summary of the Australian ex-dividend day literature and each of their 
point estimates of theta. 
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the deficiencies related to dividend drop-off studies and provides a more accurate estimate of the 
market value of both dividends and imputation credits. CFG use this method to estimate the value of 
theta around the introduction of the ‘holding period rule’ in 19978. They find that after its 
introduction, the value of theta priced into futures contracts is insignificantly different from zero. 
Since CFG, subsequent papers using the same methodology have produced estimates of theta that are 
positive and significant. SFG (2013b) and Cannavan (2013) both observe futures prices to estimate 
theta after a second regulatory change in the year 2000 that allowed for the refunding of surplus 
franking credits. SFG (2013b) provide a joint estimate for the value of cash dividends and imputation 
credits of 93.82% and 12.43% respectively, while Cannavan (2013) provides a joint-estimate of 
93.34% and 16.77%.  
While these estimated values remain substantially less than face value, both results conclude 
that the market places a positive value of imputation credits. These findings, however, are inconsistent 
with other areas of research that analyse the impact of imputation credits on the long-term cost of 
equity and firm value. Siau, Sault and Warren (2013) and Lajbcygier and Wheatley (2012) find no 
significant evidence that imputation credits reduce the cost of equity, or are capitalised into share 
prices. Similarly, Cannavan (2013) finds that the introduction of the imputation system had little to no 
effect on Australian equity prices. The conflicting results between these two subsets of research 
present a puzzle within the literature. How is it possible that dividend drop-off and simultaneous 
pricing studies have estimated that imputation credits are positively valued by long-term marginal 
investors, and yet these credits have no effect on the cost of equity or share prices of the firms that pay 
them?  
A possible explanation is that market value of imputation credits observed in these studies is 
not indicative of the value placed on them by long-term investors. The theta estimates produced in 
SFG (2013b) and Cannavan (2013) more accurately measures the average value of theta observed 
across all futures transactions. For us to believe that this average level of theta accurately represents 
the value determined by long-term providers of equity, we must assume that long-term investors 
                                                     
8
 The ‘holding period rule’ (also known as the 45-day rule) is described in Section 2.1. 
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remain the marginal, price-setting investors across all transactions within the futures market (or at 
least the vast majority). This assumption may not hold if the level of dividend-capturing arbitrage 
occurring around the ex-dividend date is significant enough to influence the price of futures, and in 
turn the estimates of theta.  
We show in Section 0 that as a futures contract with an ex-dividend event nears maturity, 
borrowing costs associated with arbitrage are minimised and potential profits increase exponentially
9
. 
This incentivizes domestic arbitrageurs to enter the market to exploit the under-pricing of imputation 
credits. Twite and Wood (1997) demonstrate this to be the case, showing that open interest increases 
dramatically in the days preceding an ex-dividend date
10
. Therefore, if the magnitude of this dividend-
capturing activity is large enough, it has the potential to bid up the value of theta in the days and 
weeks preceding the ex-dividend event. If these transactions make up a significant portion of the 
samples used in prior studies, they have the potential to upwardly bias the estimate of theta
11
. This 
means that, even with an estimate of theta free of the issues that plague dividend drop-off studies, it is 
uncertain how much of the valuation is driven by arbitrage (Mckenzie and Partington, 2010).    
1.3. Gap within Literature 
We believe these findings raise two important questions. First, to what extent are the 
estimates of theta produced in SFG (2013b) and Cannavan (2013) a reflection of the level of 
dividend-capturing activity occurring within the futures market, as opposed to the value placed on 
imputation credits by the long-term providers of equity? Due to it being the latter type of investor that 
determines the cost of capital faced by Australian firms, it is their value of theta that is most 
consequential and of most interest to us. To our knowledge, no paper has analysed the impact 
dividend-capturing activity has on the implicit values of theta observed in futures prices, and 
subsequently, whether excluding their activity from analysis provides a significantly different 
                                                     
9
 We provide evidence for this in Section 7.2.2 and show why, if profits are measured in monthly returns, 
profitability increases exponentially as the contract nears maturity. 
10
 This relationship only holds for franked dividends, with the open interest in futures associated with unfranked 
dividends experiencing no significant change around the ex-dividend date. 
11
 SFG (2014) makes this point in paragraph 152, in reference to estimating theta using dividend drop-off ratios. 
However, the same logic applies when observing simultaneous futures prices around the ex-dividend date. 
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estimate of theta; one that more accurately reflects the value placed on imputation credits determined 
by long-term providers of equity. 
Second, if the average value of the gross dividends priced into futures contracts is 
significantly less than its face value, are small domestic investors – who are predisposed to larger 
transaction and borrowing costs – able to exploit this difference in value, and achieve arbitrage 
profits? As further explained in section 5.2, a domestic investor may be able to enter into two 
simultaneous positions – a long position in a company’s stock, and a short position in a futures 
contract expiring after the ex-dividend date – in order to perfectly hedge their position, while 
collecting the gross dividend, less any transaction and interest costs. If the portion of the gross 
dividend that is unvalued in the futures contract exceeds the borrowing and transaction costs incurred, 
the investor is able to make arbitrage profits. To the best of our knowledge, this arbitrage method has 
not been analysed from the perspective of domestic investors, and its viability as a trading strategy has 
not been tested. 
1.4. Research questions 
In light of this, the research questions of this thesis, and their brief answers, are presented in 
Table I. 
Table I 
Research Questions 
Number Research question Section Answer 
RQ1 (Main) What is the market value of imputation credits (theta)? 7.1 0.00% 
RQ1.1 What is the average implicit value of theta priced into all futures quotes (FY01 – FY14)? 7.1.3 7.36% 
RQ1.2 Does dividend capturing activity impact this value? 7.1.3 Yes 
RQ1.3 What is the value placed on imputation credits by long-term equity providers? 7.1.3 0.00%12 
    
RQ2 (Main) Are domestic individuals able to generate arbitrage profits using the trading strategy outlined? 7.2 Yes 
RQ2.1 Does the strategy present profitable opportunities across the sample period? 7.2.1 Yes 
RQ2.2 Is profitability related to stock or futures specific characteristics? 7.2.2 Yes 
RQ2.3 Is the profitability affected by the two legislative changes outlined in Section 2? 7.2.3 Mixed 
RQ2.4 Using realistic examples, is a domestic investor able to use this strategy to make profits? 7.2.4 Yes 
    
                                                     
12
 The exact coefficient is equal to 0.0066 but is statistically insignificant. 
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1.5. Contribution 
By answering these questions we believe we make seven contributions to the literature: 
First, we extend the cost-of-carry no-arbitrage pricing model developed in CFG by relaxing 
certain assumptions and incorporating bid-ask quotes to more accurately reflect the prices faced by a 
representative investor. We first adjust the model to incorporate the dates at which the representative 
investor actually receives the cash dividend and imputation credits. We then incorporate bid-ask 
quotes as opposed to transaction prices to reflect the market prices faced by the representative 
investor. We find that these adjustments marginally reduce the level of mispricing observed in futures 
contracts with no ex-dividend event prior to maturity. We also estimate, and incorporate into the 
model, a fixed value of cash dividends. This allows us to analyse the value of theta across small 
subsamples that lack the variation in franking percentages required to accurately estimate both 
components of the gross dividend. 
Second, we apply this model to a novel dataset, containing all futures quotes lodged between 
1 July 2001 and 30 June 2014 – providing a final sample size of 2.3 million matched observations 
over 788 separate ex-dividend events. This is the most comprehensive analysis of the value of 
imputation credits priced into futures contracts that has been conducted to date
13
. We produce a joint 
estimate of cash dividends and imputation credits across all futures observations of 94.5% and 7.4% 
respectively. This is a significantly lower estimate of theta than those produced in the prior literature.  
Third, we find compelling evidence that dividend-capturing arbitrage inflates the value of 
theta implicit in futures quotes in the days and weeks preceding an ex-dividend event. Figure III 
displays that, when using a fixed estimate of cash dividends, theta is run up significantly – from ~0.05 
to ~0.20 – when a contract is between 65 and 50 days out from maturity, before dropping back down 
once it reaches 45 days out. This reflects the dividend-capturing activity of large institutional 
investors who must abide by the 45-day rule bidding up the value of theta implicit in futures prices. 
The value of theta once again increases significantly 10 days out from maturity, as smaller investors 
                                                     
13
 It also encompasses the largest sample period so far available (14 years) that does not contain a change in the 
imputation system.   
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who aren’t required to abide by the 45-day rule, enter the market. We reinforce this finding by 
introducing an interaction variable – between theta and the time-to-maturity – to our model. We 
discover that the value of theta increases by an average of between 0.0087 and 0.0237 each month a 
futures contract gets closer to maturity.  
Fourth, we use a subset of observations with a time-to-maturity of greater than 6 months in 
order to exclude the influence of dividend-capturers, and more accurately measure the value placed on 
a dollar of imputation credits by a long-term investor. Using this subsample of 202,247 observations, 
we find that imputation credits are priced into these quotes at a value insignificantly different from 
zero; suggesting that the marginal long-term investor is foreign, and places no value on imputation 
credits. This finding acts to solve the puzzle within the existing literature. Our results are consistent 
with research finding that imputation credits have no impact on the cost of equity, or share prices, of 
the firms that pay them; and suggest that the estimates of theta produced in the dividend drop-off and 
simultaneous pricing literature are biased upwards as a result excessive dividend-capturing activity 
occurring in the market around the ex-dividend date. 
Fifth, we provide a practical dividend-capturing arbitrage strategy that provides large 
abnormal profits, and is usable by ordinary small investors. We find that even after accounting for all 
implicit and explicit transaction costs, observations in the top 99
th
 percentile of profitability in 
financial year 2014 produced abnormal monthly returns of approximately 2.83%, while those in the 
95
th
 percentile produced abnormal monthly returns of 1.61%. While the 45-day rule prevents investors 
from redeeming more than $5,000 in imputation credits per year using this method, the strategy still 
provides a substantial profitable opportunity that can be made once a year.  
Sixth, our findings inform public policy makers of the market value of imputation credits and 
the severity of dividend-capturing occurring within the market. Our finding that long-term marginal 
investors place no value on imputation credits is consistent with prior research that suggests the 
imputation system does nothing to lower the cost of capital faced by Australian firms. Therefore, by 
maintaining the imputation system the government is doing little to benefit the wider economy, while 
incurring huge costs to effectively provide subsidies to domestic investors for their shareholdings, and 
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prop up ‘money-trees’ for small arbitrageurs. This finding has implications for future regulation, as 
well the financial viability of the dividend imputation system within Australia. 
Seventh, this thesis is one of the only studies to analyse arbitrage profitability arising from 
government enforced heterogeneity in investors, rather than the simple mispricing of securities. 
Because this arbitrage strategy is only available to small, domestic investors, it is unlikely that the 
opportunities will be priced away. In perfect capital markets, if arbitrage opportunities existed for 
non-marginal investors, they would borrow and exploit these opportunities until they were no longer 
viable. However, when these assumptions are relaxed, and investors have limited capital and 
borrowing capacity, they may not have the resources required to fully exploit these opportunities or 
become the marginal investor. As a result, these arbitrage opportunities, or ‘money-trees’, may exist 
for extended periods of time. This thesis tests this theory, and therefore also contributes to the 
literature on the limits to arbitrage, and asset pricing.  
1.6. Thesis Layout 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a breakdown of the 
legislative amendments that have occurred throughout the sample period. Section 3 provides a review 
of the literature on valuing cash dividends and imputation credits. Section 4 builds on the prior 
literature to develop the hypotheses for this thesis. Section 5 presents the framework for valuing 
imputation credits and evaluating profitability of the arbitrage strategy. Section 6 provides the data 
description and sources used, as well as appropriate descriptive statistics. Section 7 presents the 
methodology, results and analysis. Section 8 concludes with a summary of our findings, before 
discussing the limitations of our study and the potential direction for further research in this area. 
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2. Legislative Changes 
Over the course of our sample period (1996 to 2014), three legislative amendments have 
occurred that we believe significantly impact the value of theta, and in turn may have significantly 
impacted the profitability of the arbitrage strategy. These are described in sections 2.1 to 2.3
14
: 
2.1. July 1, 1997 – ‘Holding Period Rule’ 
In May 1997 the federal government announced two policies aimed at preventing foreign 
investors from trading and deriving value from imputation credits (Commonwealth of Australia, 
1999). The first policy, and most relevant for this study, is known as the ‘holding period rule’ (or the 
45-day rule). This measure stipulates that in order for domestic investors to redeem imputation 
credits, they must have held the stock at risk
15
 for a minimum period of 45 days. The intention of this 
policy was to ensure that imputation credits are only attributable to the ‘economic owners’ of the 
stock. It does this by preventing short-term arbitrageurs trading in and out of stocks in order to capture 
dividends and their associated imputation credits, as well as preventing arbitrageurs from taking fully 
hedged positions in order to exploit the under-pricing of imputation credits without incurring any 
risk
16
. 
An important caveat to this rule is that ‘small shareholders’ are exempt and do not have to 
abide by its stipulations. A small shareholder was defined as an investor who received less than 
$2,500 in imputation credits in one financial year
17
. 
The second policy is referred to as the ‘related payments rule’. This measure disallows 
domestic investors from borrowing stocks from foreign investors around the ex-dividend date in 
                                                     
14
 Also refer to Beggs and Skeels (2006) for a comprehensive description of legislative changes between 1988 
and 2000. 
15
 This is defined as being less than 70% hedged using similar securities (such as futures and other derivative 
contracts). 
16
 The trading strategy evaluated in this proposed thesis is one of the arbitrage strategies that have been used, 
and one of the main strategies that the ‘45-day rule’ was introduced to eliminate. 
17
 This cut-off was raised to $5,000 in July, 2000 
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exchange for a fee. A component of this fee is a portion of the imputation credits received by the 
domestic investor, and is therefore acts as a mechanism for trading imputation credits.  
2.2. July 1, 2000 – ‘Refunds for Unused Credits’ 
In July of 2000, individuals and institutions became entitled to cash refunds for excess of 
unused imputation credits at the end of the financial year. This mainly benefited tax-exempt entities 
such as superannuation funds or individuals with no other taxable income. This provided value to 
excess franking credits that were previously worthless, and incentivised superannuation funds and 
other similar entities to purchase stocks with franked dividends. 
In addition, two other minor changes to the imputation system occurred on this date. First, the 
cut-off for being defined as a ‘small shareholder’, and therefore exempt from the holding period rule, 
was increased from $2,500 of imputation credits to $5,000. Second, the company tax rate was reduced 
from 36% to 34%. While this increases the cash component of dividends for shareholders, it also acts 
to reduce the amount of imputation credits attached to a fully franked dividend. Although this doesn’t 
seem significant, it may unintentionally reduce the unvalued portion of the gross dividend relative to 
transaction costs (as a portion of stock price), therefore marginally reducing the profitability of 
dividend capturing arbitrage strategies. 
2.3. July 1, 2013 – ‘Dividend Washing Ban’ 
In June, 2014 regulatory changes to the imputation system received royal assent, which 
retroactively ban the act of ‘dividend washing’ from 1 July 2013 onwards. Dividend washing is a 
process that allows sophisticated investors the ability to receive two sets of gross dividends for the 
same bundle of shares. They do this by holding a bundle of shares for the required 45-day period, 
before selling them on the ex-dividend date. The investor receives the dividend and imputation credit, 
and uses these along with the proceeds of the sale of their shares to purchase an identical bundle of 
shares cum-dividend in the special ‘cum-dividend market’18. This effectively allows the single 
                                                     
18
 The special ‘cum-dividend’ market is provided by the ASX at the request of certain trading participants, and 
is only available to large, sophisticated investors.  
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investor to receive two bundles of gross dividends for the one parcel of shares. The shares sold in the 
special ‘cum-dividend’ market are sold at a premium, thus allowing foreign investors to pursue this 
strategy to receive a portion of the imputation credits as a premium. The regulations introduced will 
not have a direct impact on the proposed trading strategy, but they do act to restrict the trading of 
imputation credits, which may have a slight negative impact on the value of theta. However, as this 
regulation was not implemented until 30 June 2014, we don’t believe that its affects will have been 
priced into futures contracts before this date. For these reasons we exclude this regulatory change 
from our analysis, however we end our sample period at 30 June 2014 to ensure that no substantial 
effects of this change are present in our analysis.  
2.4. Regulatory Periods 
Based on these regulatory changes, and the impact we believe they’ve had on the value of 
theta, and in turn the profitability of the trading strategy, we break our sample period up into three 
regulatory periods. These are displayed in Table II. 
Table II 
Regulatory Periods 
Period Relevant Dates Financial Years 
PERIOD1 1 Jan 1996 to 30 June 1997 FY96 – FY97 
PERIOD2 1 July 1997 to 30 June 2000 FY98 – FY00 
PERIOD3 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2014 FY01 – FY14 
   
When conducting our tests we either analyse these periods separately, or incorporate dummy 
variables to our models to capture a change in regulatory periods. When valuing imputation credits we 
restrict our sample to observations falling within the regulatory period PERIOD3. This is the longest 
period available that is unaffected by exogenous changes to the imputation system, and allows us to 
provide the most consistent and robust estimate of theta.   
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3. Literature Review 
The following literature review provides a discussion of the prior research on the valuation of 
dividends, and how these methods have been applied to the Australian setting with the inclusion of 
imputation credits. Section 3.1 discusses the theoretical and empirical research on ex-dividend day 
price behaviour in a United States (US) setting, which has been the predominant method used in 
determining the market value of dividends. Section 3.2 reviews how these methods have been applied 
to an Australian setting to value imputation credits, and then discuss the known problems with these 
types of studies and their findings. Section 3.3 presents the literature on valuing imputation credits 
through the simultaneous pricing of securities, and outlines how these methods alleviate many of the 
shortcomings present in dividend drop-off studies.   
3.1. Ex-dividend day studies in the US 
In the Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) world of complete and perfect capital markets, 
payout policy is irrelevant, and investors have no preference for either dividends or capital gains
19
. 
Therefore, they should be indifferent between selling a share they own cum-dividend, or waiting to 
collect the dividend and selling ex-dividend. For this to be the case the payoffs from these two choices 
must equal: 
 𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑝 = (𝑃𝑥 − 𝑃𝑝) + 𝐷 (1) 
   
Where 𝑃𝑝 is stock’s purchase price, 𝑃𝑐 is the share price cum-dividend, 𝑃𝑥 is the share price 
ex-dividend, and 𝐷 is the value of the dividend. The change in share price from cum-dividend to ex-
dividend, as a ratio of the dividend, should therefore equal one as shown below: 
 𝐷𝑂𝑅 =
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑥
𝐷
= 1 (2) 
   
Where DOR is known as the dividend drop-off ratio.  
                                                     
19
 The assumptions that underlie the Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1961) world of complete and perfect capital 
markets will henceforth be referred to as the ‘MM assumptions’. 
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In spite of this theory, countless studies have observed an average drop-off ratio of less than 
one (see Campbell and Beranek (1955), Durand and May (1960), Lakonishock and Vermaelen (1983), 
Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984), among others), and has resulted in a hypothesis that the market values a 
dollar of dividends less than a dollar of capital gains. According to the no-arbitrage framework, the 
divergence of DOR from one must therefore result from a violation of one of the MM assumptions, or 
from an issue of measurement. Subsequent to this, an array of literature has emerged attempting to 
incorporate certain market inefficiencies or imperfections into this framework in order to explain the 
ex-day premium anomaly. Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003) state that three explanations are 
most prominent within the literature: (1) the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains; (2) 
the interaction of taxes and transaction costs; and (3) market microstructure attributes such as price 
discreteness and bid-ask bounce.   
In one of the first papers to develop a model including differential taxation as an explanation 
for the ex-day premium, Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the drop-off ratio should reflect the 
preferential tax treatment given to capital gains. By incorporating taxation into the no-arbitrage 
framework the after-tax payoffs from the two sale methods become: 
 (𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑝)(1 − 𝜏𝑔) = (𝑃𝑥 − 𝑃𝑝)(1 − 𝜏𝑔) + 𝐷(1 − 𝜏𝑑) (3) 
   
Where 𝜏𝑔the tax is rate on capital gains, and 𝜏𝑑 is the tax rate on dividends. Rearranging (3) 
the drop-off ratio should then equal: 
 𝐷𝑂𝑅 =
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑥
𝐷
=
1 − 𝜏𝑑
1 − 𝜏𝑔
 (4) 
   
The authors argue that a share’s drop-off ratio should therefore reflect the tax rates of the 
marginal investor. They predict that high-taxed individuals will prefer low dividend yield stocks, 
resulting in investors forming tax clienteles like those discussed by Modigliani and Miller (1961). 
Consistent with their prediction, they find that in the US where capital gains are given preferential tax 
treatment, shares have an average DOR of approximately 0.8. They find that high dividend yield 
stocks have lower drop-off ratios, suggesting that their marginal investors have lower tax rates, and 
that the hypothesised tax clienteles do exist. This became known within the literature as the ‘tax 
hypothesis’. 
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Subsequent to this study, the ‘tax hypothesis’ has faced mix results. Barclay (1987) finds that 
prior to the introduction of the federal income tax, ex-dividend day prices dropped by the full amount 
of the dividend. Numerous other papers look at exogenous shocks to differential tax rates, and find 
that ex-day premiums are affected in ways consistent with the ‘tax hypothesis’ (Poterba and Summers, 
1984; Hubbard and Michaely, 1997; Bell and Jenkinson, 2002; and Graham, Michaely and Roberts, 
2003), while others find that in settings with differential taxation ex-day premiums vary with dividend 
yields (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Karpoff and Walkling, 1990; Michaley and Vila, 1995; and 
Green and Rydqvist, 1999). In contrast, Michaely (1991) analyses ex-dividend day price behaviour 
around a major tax reform in 1986, and finds no significant effect on ex-day premiums, and therefore 
no evidence of a tax effect. Several other authors have provided evidence against the tax hypothesis, 
including Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) who find abnormal 
ex-day premiums in a number of non-taxable distributions. In a thorough review of the literature 
Farre-Mensa, Michaely and Hess (2014) conclude that, while they find no reliable evidence that 
differential taxation has a significant impact on firm value, at the dividend level it appears that it does 
play a role, at least marginally, in the pricing of shares around the ex-dividend date.   
A major drawback of the Elton and Gruber (1970) model is the absence of transaction costs, 
which have been shown to be an important determinant of both prices and the boundaries within 
which they can fluctuate (Kalay, 1982; Miller and Scholes, 1982; and Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994). 
Kalay (1982) incorporates ‘round-trip’ transaction costs into the Elton and Gruber (1970) model and 
demonstrates that the drop-off ratio may fluctuate within boundaries without presenting arbitrage 
opportunities. The size of these boundaries are dependent on the magnitude of transaction costs 
relative to a share’s dividend yield. He also argues that short-term traders face the same tax rates on 
dividends as capital gains, and they would be the dominant arbitrageurs around the ex-day. If this is 
the case DORs would only be able to diverge from one, insofar as the transaction costs related to the 
arbitrage exceeded the payoffs from the divergence.  
This became known within the literature as the “short-term trader” hypothesis. Assuming 
transaction costs as a portion of stock prices, as well as homogenous taxation, Kalay (1982) 
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demonstrates that the drop off ratio may fluctuate between the following two boundaries without 
presenting arbitrage opportunities: 
 1 −
𝛼?̅?
𝐷
≤
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑥
𝐷
≤ 1 +
𝛼?̅?
𝐷
 (5) 
   
 
 
Where 𝛼 represents round trip transactions costs as a portion of share price, and ?̅? is an 
average of the cum-dividend and ex-dividends prices. It is therefore apparent that the size of the 
boundaries within which the DOR can fluctuate are dependent on the magnitude of transaction costs 
relative to a share’s dividend yield. For example, an arbitrage strategy targeting a low-yield stock will 
have high transaction costs relative to the dividend, or payoff, and therefore would require a higher 
divergence in the DOR to be profitable. However, in this scenario it is likely that transaction costs will 
be significantly large enough relative to the expected drop-off in price, that short-term arbitrageurs 
would not enter the market. In this case the drop-off ratio would be set by long-term marginal 
investors, as suggested by Elton and Gruber (1970). Kalay (1982) argues that this makes it impossible 
to deduce the tax rates of marginal investors by simple observing the drop-off ratios of different 
stocks, and that differential taxation is not the sole determinant of the market value of dividends. 
Despite Kalay (1982; 1984) introducing the idea that the market value of dividends may be 
set by different types of investors at different levels of dividend yield, his study fails to explore 
additional types of investors, or the circumstances under which the marginal investor of stocks may 
differ. The model also assumes risk-neutrality and ignores the true complexity of their tax rates. Boyd 
and Jagganathan (1994) mitigate these issues by extending Kalay’s (1980) theory to include the 
trading actions of four different types of investors trading around the ex-date. As a result of 
differential taxation and transaction costs, each investor has a different equation under which he is 
indifferent between buying or selling ex-dividend, or not trading at all. A culmination of these 
indifference curves provides the equilibrium drop-off points for each dividend yield, and the marginal 
price setters for each; as well as showing that the theoretical relationship between dividend-yield and 
drop-off ratio is positive, non-linear and convex.  
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The variation in equilibriums resulting from changes in dividend yields provide a unique 
insight into who will be the marginal investor, and how the drop-off ratio is determined. The authors 
show that, consistent with Kalay (1982), at very low-dividend yields, equilibrium is set by taxable 
individuals buying and selling shares, while slightly higher yield stocks have equilibriums set by 
short-term arbitrageurs. At even higher yields the equilibrium is set by dividend capturers, or 
corporations who have preferential tax treatment for dividend income. The most interesting insight 
from this analysis, and most relevant for this proposed thesis, is that the authors find at very high 
yields, a situation occurs where no possible equilibrium can exist without presenting arbitrage 
opportunities to at least one type of investor. The authors are unable to determine which investor 
should win out in this situation, and in turn set the price, and state that no theoretical argument exists 
for the outcome. Although under different circumstances, this situation may mirror the Australian 
market, where heterogeneity of investors may result in an equilibrium price where arbitrage is still 
attainable for at least one type of investor. 
Kalay (1982) also points out that uncertainty is a necessary component of the ex-day analysis, 
due to the actual price-drop being unknown by arbitrageurs ex-ante. The risk faced by short-term 
traders attempting to make arbitrage profits around the ex-day is modelled by Heath and Jarrow 
(1988) and Michaely and Vila (1995). They both demonstrate that risk, measured as the variance in 
stock returns, should be negatively related to the ex-day drop off in order to compensate arbitrageurs 
for the increased risk in trading. Michaely and Vila (1996) combine both transaction and risk to their 
analysis, and find that trading volume is significantly higher around the ex-day and inversely related 
to transaction costs. This provides further evidence that arbitrageurs exploiting tax heterogeneity is a 
function of transaction costs, and therefore only shares with transaction costs that are significantly 
high relative to the payoffs (low dividiend-yield stocks) would display ex-day price behaviour that 
reflects the preferences of long-term investors.  
Frank and Jagganathan (1994) was also one of the first papers to highlight the fact that price 
discreteness can cause issues when measuring the relationship between dividends and the expected 
price drop. If dividends are paid in continuous amounts, but stock price ticks are restricted to discrete 
numbers (1/8 or 1/16 prior to the introduction of decimalization) prices may be unable to drop by the 
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exact amount of the dividend
20
. Although it’s expected on average that the price drop would equal the 
dividend, the increased variation in drop-offs would result in larger standard errors, as well as 
introduce uncertainty regarding which tick the ex-day price will move to. This uncertainty creates risk 
for arbitrageurs trying to predict the expected drop-off, and may actually result in a decline in 
equilibrium drop-off ratios. Bali and Hite (1998) continue this explanation, and argue that ex-day 
price drops are likely to be rounded down to the nearest tick, resulting in a drop-off less than the 
dividend amount
21
. However, Jakob and Ma (2004) find that ex-day price drops are equally likely to 
be rounded upwards to the nearest tick as they are to be rounded downwards, which directly 
contradicts the assumptions of Bali and Hite (1998).  
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) argue that the ex-day premium can be affected by bid-ask 
spreads, and find that in Hong Kong, where neither dividends or capital gains are taxed, drop-off 
ratios are less than one. This highlights that, although market microstructure explanations may not be 
the sole determinant, ex-day premiums can exist in the absence of differential taxation
22
. Graham, 
Michaely and Roberts (2003) reassess these findings by analysing the impact of exogenous shocks in 
the bid-ask spread. Specifically, they look at transition from 1/8
th
 pricing to decimalisation in the US, 
and contrary to the microstructure explanation, find that the resulting decrease in bid-ask spreads was 
paired with a significant decrease in drop-off ratios. This suggests that the findings of Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998) may be a result of correlation rather than causation, and that there may be other 
explanations for the ex-day premium that have yet to be explored within the literature. 
3.2. Ex-dividend day studies in Australia 
Brown and Walter (1986) were one of the first papers to do a thorough analysis of ex-
dividend day price behaviour in the Australian setting. They analyse dividend drop-offs prior to 
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 For example, assuming markets were frictionless and taxes are non-existent, if a company pays a dividend of 
$0.05, and prices could only change by discrete ticks (one eighth of a dollar), the price could either drop by zero 
or $0.125.  
21
 They also argue that due to dividends and dividend yields being highly correlated that “discreteness will give 
the impression of tax-induced dividend clienteles even if there are none”. 
22
 Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) also find that non-taxable stock distributions generate abnormal returns over the 
ex-dividend period, suggesting that DORs diverge from one even in the absence of differential taxation. 
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introduction of imputation system, and using a sample from 1974 – 1985 they find a median DOR of 
0.84 and an average DOR of 0.68, suggesting that the drop-off ratios during that period were 
significantly less than one, and their distribution was positively skewed. They state that the 
deregulation of brokerage rates in 1984
23
 had no significant impact on ex-day drop-offs due to the 
median DOR only increasing marginally (0.74 to 0.85), however the average DOR increased from 
0.52 in 1984 to 0.97 in 1985, and for the first time in 10 years their sample of observed DORs became 
negatively skewed. This may suggest that, while the median DOR has increased marginally, the 
observations lying above that increased and converge towards one (due to having larger dividend 
yields), resulting in the change in distribution, while the DORs of lower yield stocks have remained 
constant due to transaction costs still being too large relative to their dividends for arbitrage to occur. 
Therefore, we disagree with the assertion made by Brown and Walter, that their results are 
inconsistent with the arguments and findings put forward by Kalay (1982), and that transaction costs 
do not significantly impact ex-day drop-offs. 
Brown and Clarke (1993) is one of the first papers to use the ex-day methodology to value 
dividends under an imputation system in Australia. The authors start with the Elton and Gruber (1970) 
model, and build on it to incorporate franking credits, transaction costs, and the indexation of capital 
gains
24
. Rearranging their indifference equation, the gross drop-off ratio should equal 
 𝐺𝐷𝑂𝑅 =
1 − 𝑡𝑑
(1 − 𝑡𝑔)(1 + 𝛼)
 [1 +
𝑘𝑡𝑐
1 − 𝑡𝑐
] (6) 
   
Where 𝛼 is the transaction cost per dollar of shares, and 𝑘 is the proportion of dividend that is 
franked. They measure the gross drop-off ratio (GDOR) for each observation by taking the market-
adjusted ex-day price change, and dividing it by the face value of the gross dividend (the sum of the 
cash component and franking credit)  
 𝐺𝐷𝑂𝑅𝑖 =
𝑃𝑐(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑝𝑥
𝐺
 (7) 
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 This represents a negative exogenous shock to transaction costs, and as argued by Kalay (1982) should result 
in drop-off ratios converging to one for a larger number of stocks. 
24
 Prior to the introduction of the capital gains discount (where CGT is halved for assets held longer than 12 
months) investors were able to deduct inflation from their asset gains, in order to only tax real gains. Because of 
the short-term nature of the study, the effect of indexation on the models results are insignificant (~5bps). We 
have therefore left this factor out of the Brown and Clarke (1993) model for the sake of simplicity 
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Where 𝑟𝑚 is the return on the market index over the ex-dividend period, and 𝐺 is the face 
value of the gross dividend, which is defined as 
 𝐺 = 𝐷 + 𝐹 = 𝐷 [1 +
𝑘𝑡𝑐
1 − 𝑡𝑐
] (8) 
   
This relationship is a general rule that holds for estimating the gross dividend, and is used 
throughout the extant literature.  
Due to the heteroscedasticity present in the error term when applying Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) to the above GDOR equation
25
 the authors scale the entire equation by the cum-dividend share 
price, which has been shown to improve this problem (Turnbull and Wood, 1989; Wood, 1991), albeit 
only marginally. This produces the following parametric form 
 
𝑃𝑐(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑃𝑥
𝑃𝑐
= 𝜆
𝐺
𝑃𝑐
+ 𝜀 (9) 
   
Where 𝜆 can be interpreted as the estimated market value for one dollar of gross dividends. 
They also extend the period of measurement to 4 days before the ex-dividend day, and 4 days after. 
This acts to mitigate some of the market microstructure issues resulting from thinly traded stocks and 
prevents the use of stale prices.   
The authors do not attempt to value dividends and franking credits individually, but rather 
analyse the change in gross drop-off ratios over the period of three separate tax changes. They find 
that, contrary to the ‘tax hypothesis’, gross drop-off ratios decreased after the introduction of the 
capital gains tax in 1985, and that GDORs increased after the introduction of the imputation tax 
system in 1987. However, the increase was statistically insignificant. In contrast, the increase in gross 
drop-off ratios in 1988 was statistically significant. This suggests that it took some time for the change 
in value to be incorporated into ex-day pricing, or potentially for schemes to be developed that allow 
foreign investors to derive value from the credits. 
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 See Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983), Beggs and Skeeles (2006), or Gellard, Mero and Vo (2013) 
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Bellamy (1994) builds on this study by analysing the relationship between dividend drop-off 
ratios
26
 and the portion of the dividend that is franked. Due to them measuring the ex-day price 
change relative to only the cash component of the dividend, if imputation credits have any value at all, 
a relationship should exist between the level of franking and drop-off. Using an OLS regression on a 
sample from 1987 to 1992, Bellamy finds that shares with franked dividends have significantly higher 
drop-off ratios, which is consistent with the hypothesis that franking credits increase the value of 
dividends.  
Despite providing the insight that imputation credits do have some value, neither of these 
papers set out to specifically determine the market value of imputation credits. Subsequent to these 
papers, an array of literature has emerged that uses ex-dividend day price behaviour as a method of 
determining the market value of theta. A summary of their results, sample periods and methodology is 
presented in Table III below.  
Table III 
Summary of theta estimates from ex-dividend drop-off studies 
Paper Techniques Sample period Theta estimate 
Brown and Clarke (1993) Ordinary Least Squares 
1987 – 1989 0.18 
1989 – 1991 0.80 
Bruckner, Dews and White (1994) Ordinary Least Squares 
1987 – 1990 0.34 
1990 – 1993 0.69 
Hathaway and Officer (1999) Uncertain Uncertain 0.44 
Hathaway and Officer (2004) Generalised Least Squares 1986 – 2004 0.49 
Bellamy and Gray (2004) Uncertain 1995 – 2002 0.00 
Beggs and Skeels (2006) Generalised Least Squares 
1992 – 1997 0.20 
1998 – 1999 0.42 
2000 – 2000 0.13 
2001 – 2004 0.57 
SFG (2007) Generalised Least Squares 1998 – 2002 0.23 
Feuerherdt, Gray and Hall (2008) Generalised Least Squares 1995 – 2002 0.00 
SFG (2009) Generalised Least Squares 2000 – 2006 0.24 
SFG (2011) 
Generalised Least Squares 
and MM Regression 
2000 – 2010 0.35 
Vo, Gellard and Mero (2013) 
Generalised Least Squares 
and MM Regression 
2001 – 2012 0.45 
SFG (2013a) 
Generalised Least Squares 
and MM Regression 
2001 – 2012 0.35 
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 It should be noted they do not use the gross drop-off ratio like Brown and Clarke (1993), but rather divide the 
ex-day price change by the cash component of the dividend only, such that 
𝐷𝑂𝑅 =
𝑃𝑐 − 𝑃𝑥
𝐷
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*Papers shaded grey are seen as providing the most accurate estimates, and are the most relevant for this proposed thesis 
 
 Bruckner, Dews and White (1994) also utilise an OLS method to determine the market value 
of imputation credits over a similar sample period. They generate an estimate of theta of 0.34 between 
1987 and 1990 (compared to Brown and Clarke’s estimate of 0.18 for 1987 – 1989). These 
differences in estimates for a similar period highlight the sensitivity of results to the different filters 
and sample selection used by each of the authors (Wood, 1997; McKenzie and Partington, 2010). 
Similar to Brown and Clarke, this paper’s estimates suffer from wide confidence intervals, resulting 
from significant noise in security prices (Twite and Wood, 1997; Wood, 1997; CFG). Hathaway and 
Officer (1996) use a similar methodology, but build on these studies by estimating the value of 
franking credits across sub-samples of securities split on the basis of market capitalisation, industrial 
sector and dividend yield. They estimate theta to equal 0.61 for resource stocks, and 0.30 for 
industrial stocks, and find a positive relationship between dividend yield and the value of franking 
credits. 
Both Bruckner, Dew and White (1994) and Hathaway and Officer (1996), estimate that 
franking credits are valued higher than cash dividends for significant portions of their sample period. 
This is extremely unlikely to be the case, given that franking credits are only redeemable for a portion 
of investors, and are unable to be utilised until the end of the financial year. It is more likely that this 
finding is an error resulting from the difficulty in accurately separating the estimates of the cash and 
franking component when they are measured jointly, and the subsequent multicollinearity
27
.  
Similar to Brown and Clarke (1993), Beggs and Skeels (2006) acknowledge that drop-off 
regressions suffer from heteroscedasticity. However, rather than using a White (1980) adjustment to 
standard errors, or scaling their equations by the cum-dividend price like previous papers, they opt for 
using a feasible generalised least squares estimator (FGLS). This is a more complex method of 
specification, however it is more efficient than White’s standard errors in dealing with 
heteroscedasticity, and as seen in the table above has been used in the majority of subsequent studies. 
Their FGLS specification assumes that the variance in observations is related to the gross dividend 
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 See Wood (1997a), Cannavan, Finn and Gray (2004), Bellamy and Gray (2004), Mckenzie and Partington 
(2010), Gellard, Mero and Vo (2013) 
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(Brown and Walter, 1986), cum-dividend price (Brown and Clarke, 1993), and market 
capitalisation
28
. Adjusting the drop-off ratio to account for aggregate movements in the market, and 
filtering observations to only include firms whose market capitalisation exceeds 0.03% of the All 
Ordinaries Index, the authors estimate theta to equal 0.57 for the period of 2001 – 2004.  
However, their estimates range wildly from year to year, and the inverse relation between the 
cash and franking component leads to frequent nonsensical results. As pointed out by SFG (2009), 
Beggs and Skeels’ estimates of theta rely on the value of cash dividends being less than one, and in 
years where their estimate of cash dividends is high (sometimes in excess of 100% of face value), 
their estimates of theta are often negative. SFG (2009) recreate the Beggs and Skeels study, while 
extending the data to 2006 and removing influential outliers from the sample using Cook’s D, in order 
to increase the accuracy and robustness of the methodology. The removal of outliers has the effect of 
reducing the value of theta to a more reasonable estimate, with SFG estimating theta to equal 0.24 
over the period 2000 – 2006.29 
SFG (2011) provide one of the most comprehensive drop-off studies to date, incorporating 
many of the mitigants already discussed, as well as multiple model specifications for the sake of 
robustness. The authors provide a much more thorough screening of the data, cross-referencing 
between multiple data sources as well manually entering observations in order to minimise the 
number of erroneous observations
30
. Similar to Beggs and Skeels (2006), only firms with market 
capitalisation in excess of 0.03% of the All Ordinaries Index are included, and extreme observations – 
or those with significant price-sensitive announcements around the ex-dividend date – are omitted. 
The authors specify four separate models to value the cash and franking component separately. The 
first is a basic OLS model, the other three models use Generalised Least Squares (GLS), and assume 
that the variance in errors is related to the dividend yield, stock return variability (inversely), or 
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 This relationship is thought to exist because larger companies are more heavily traded, mitigating the problem 
of stale prices, and resulting in smaller standard errors  
29
 Their results still rely on the assumption that dividends are less than fully valued, however the updated 
methodology provides much more consistent estimates of theta (between 0.22 – 0.25 for the three sample 
periods)  
30
 A number of errors result from dividends being originally denominated in a foreign currency. These were 
subsequently converted into AUD by SFG, however it’s quite possible that errors such as these have been 
apparent in prior studies, which may have led to inconsistent or biased results. 
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both
31
. The four models are run using normal regressions, before being rerun using the MM 
regression
32
, and then subjected to numerous robustness checks. The authors use all of these results, 
providing more weighting to the more robust specifications and regressions, to derive a point estimate 
for theta of 0.35, along with an estimate of 0.85 to 0.90 for the value of cash dividends.  
Gellard, Mero and Vo (2013) produce a similar study, using similar methodology. Like SFG 
(2011) they use MM regressions and specify multiple models using different GLS scaling variables. 
In contrast, they scale by cum-dividend price, cash dividend, cum-dividend price multiplied by stock 
price volatility, and cash dividend multiplied by stock price volatility. Their choice in scalar variables 
appear to be less justified and less intuitive than those used in SFG, however their robust regressions 
still produce relatively similar estimates of theta. They use an average of the MM regressions and 
LAD regressions to produce a point estimate for theta of 0.45 for the period 2001 – 201233. We 
believe the SFG (2011) study produces a more reliable and consistent estimate of theta, due to their 
justification of scaling variables and the robustness of their sampling methodology. SFG (2013a) 
reproduces their 2011 study, increasing their sample period to 2012, and finds that 0.35 remains the 
most appropriate point estimate of theta.  
It’s apparent from the past two sections that the US literature on ex-day drop-offs have 
focused on developing theoretical reasoning for drop-off ratios less than unity, while the Australian 
literature has focused on mitigating statistical and econometric issues related to accurately measuring 
drop-off ratios. While recent studies have introduced robust methodology for reducing biases resulting 
from heteroscedasticity, outliers and sample selection, these studies still suffer from some significant 
issues.  
First, even the most recent and robust studies, assume that the value of franking credits do not 
vary over the sample period and is constant across industries and firms. Obviously this ignores tax 
clienteles which may exist (Bellamy, 1994), and is contrary to the evidence provided by Hathaway 
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 The authors don’t use market capitalisation as a GLS scaling variable like Beggs and Skeels (2006), however, 
due to the sampling method used, it is unlikely that thinly traded stocks, or observations with stale prices will be 
included. 
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 This is form of robust regression described by Yohai (1987) 
33
 If only MM estimates are used they determine an average of 0.375, which is extremely close to the estimate 
put forward by SFG (0.35) 
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and Officer (2004) who finds that drop-off ratios are related to market capitalisation, dividend yield 
and the level of franking.  
Second, recent studies have not adequately considered the arguments put forward in the US 
literature. That transaction costs, risk, and market microstructure factors impact the ability to infer 
market values of dividends and imputation credits for ex-day price movements. To my knowledge 
none of the Australian studies have incorporated transaction costs or bid-ask spreads into their drop-
off modelling, despite being integral to the ex-day equilibrium (Kalay, 1982; Boyd and Jagannathan, 
1994; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1998; Ainsworth and Lee, 2014).
34
 Most recent studies attempting to  
value imputation credits make no mention as to whether the ex-day price drop-off is determined by 
long-term or short-term investors, and do not consider the conflicting “tax hypothesis” and “short-
term trading hypothesis” in their valuation. 
Third, drop-off studies will always require measuring cash dividends and franking 
components jointly, and then estimating their individual components separately. It’s necessary to 
observe dividends with less than 100% franking for this estimation, otherwise the cash and franking 
component will be perfectly collinear, and lead to multicollinearity issues. However, samples are 
usually dominated by fully franked dividends and may therefore suffer from multicollinearity and 
errors in estimations (CFG; McKenzie and Partington, 2010; Gellard, Mero and Vo, 2013).  
3.3. Simultaneous pricing 
An alternative method of valuing imputation credits is by comparing the prices of two 
simultaneously trading securities that are identical in every way, except that only one is entitled to 
dividends. This method has several advantages over the drop-off studies. First, because the securities 
are trading simultaneously, both would prices would react synchronously to general market 
movements and other factors unrelated to dividends. This means that, unlike drop-off studies, the 
observations are not subject to random price movements. Additionally, arbitrage opportunities no 
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 Ainsworth and Lee (2014) finds that bid-ask spreads on ASX stocks increase dramatically on the ex-dividend 
day, and that the amount of franking credits attached to a dividend are positively related to the increase in bid-
ask spreads. This could exarbate the issues stemming from the bid-ask bounce (Frank and Jagannathan, 1998) 
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longer occur across time periods
35
, therefore eliminating the risk faced by arbitrageurs and allowing 
prices to remain closer to equilibrium. Second, every time the securities are traded another 
observation is generated. This can potentially provide hundreds (or thousands) of observations for 
every ex-dividend day, greatly increasing potential sample sizes, and mitigating the significant pricing 
noise present in ex-dividend day studies.  
Table IV 
Summary of theta estimates from simultaneous pricing studies 
Paper Securities and sample Sample period Theta estimate 
Twite and Wood (1997) 
ISFs and underlying shares 
~10 ASX listed firms 
1994 – 1995 0.45 
Cannavan, Finn and Gray (2004) 
ISFs LEPOs and underlying shares 
~20 ASX listed firms 
1994 – 1997 0.15 
1997 – 1999 0.00 
Cummings and Frino (2008) 
ISFs and underlying index 
ASX200 index 
2002 – 2005 0.54 
Cannavan (2013) 
ISFs LEPOs and underlying shares 
~30 ASX listed firms 
2000 – 2008 0.17 
SFG (2013b) 
ISFs LEPOs and underlying shares 
~30 ASX listed firms 
2000 – 2013 0.12 
*Papers shaded grey are seen as providing the most accurate estimates, and are the most relevant for this proposed thesis 
 
One of the first studies of this kind is Twite and Wood (1997), who infer the value of 
dividends and imputation credits by observing the simultaneous prices of Individual Share Futures 
(ISF) contracts  (which are not entitled to dividends) and their underlying shares (which are). They 
argue that if the difference in the price of a futures contract (maturing ex-dividend) and the 
simultaneous cum-dividend price of its underlying share – also known as the basis – reflects only the 
cash component of the dividend, then foreign investors are able to receive the exact same return from 
a long synthetic position (long futures position), as they can from a long position in the actual shares. 
However, under these circumstances domestic investors are able to buy the stock, and short the 
futures contract to obtain the entire gross dividend (cash + franking credit) at the expense of the cash 
component alone. In contrast, if the basis reflects the full value of the gross dividend, then no 
arbitrage opportunities are available for domestic investors, however foreign investors are able to 
achieve higher returns from a long synthetic position than a long position in the underlying shares.  
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 As mentioned by Brown and Clarke (1993), arbitrageurs attempting to capture dividends and the ex-day 
premium are unsure of what the actual drop-off ratio will be. This means that they face risk, and prices must 
diverge further from parity in order to compensate them for arbitraging. This creates bounds around the 
equilibrium price within which it can fluctuate without presenting arbitrage opportunities. 
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Therefore the value of the gross dividend that is priced into the futures contract will depend 
on which class of investor is more dominant in the futures market, or in other words, which class of 
investor is the marginal investor. This is because the marginal investor must be indifferent between 
the after-tax payoffs from the two investments, otherwise arbitrage opportunities will exist. Based on 
this no-arbitrage framework, Twite and Wood (1997) perform a multivariate regression of the basis
36
 
against the face value of the cash dividend and imputation credit as follows: 
 
𝑋𝑡1𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡2)
𝑆𝑡1
= 𝛽1
𝐷
𝑆𝑡1
+ 𝛽2
𝐼𝐶
𝑆𝑡1
+ 𝜀 (10) 
   
Where 𝑋𝑡1 is the ISF basis at time 𝑡1, and 𝑆𝑡1 is the share price at time 𝑡1. He finds that from 
1994-1995 imputation credits are priced at 45% of their face value, while cash dividends are priced at 
86% of their face value. This suggests that, in the absence of transaction costs, domestic investors 
conducting arbitrage are able to purchase a $1 cash dividend plus a 56.25 cent imputation credit for 
$1.11 through the arbitrage strategy outlined in this proposed thesis. Twite and Wood (1997) also 
finds that open interest in ISFs increases dramatically just prior to the ex-dividend date, suggesting 
that dividend capturing strategies are occurring, but due to the marginal investor not being domestic 
(on average) these arbitrage opportunities remain available. These findings suggest that the Australian 
market may reflect the situation outlined in Frank and Jagannathan (1994) where investor 
heterogeneity leads to an equilibrium price in which arbitrage opportunities still exist for at least one 
class of investor.  
Due to the sample period covering the first two years of ISF’s trading (1994-1995), the 
market it relatively immature and only trades on 10 of the largest and most heavily traded stocks. It’s 
illiquidity at the time also makes it hard to match contemporaneous trades
37
, and results in a relatively 
small sample size. In addition to this, the vast majority of observations have franking percentages of 
either 0% or 100%
38
. Using the unfranked observations to then infer the value of imputation credits in 
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 Or the difference between the contemporaneous ISF and share transaction price 
37
 For the basis to be accurately calculated the authors must find simultaneous in the two securities. Twite and 
Wood (1997) do this by observing the transaction price of shares that trade within 5 minutes of a trade in the 
futures contract 
38
 Only 2 of the 22 dividends analysed were partially franked  
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franked dividends therefore carries the implicit assumption that the value of the cash component is 
independent of whether the dividend is unfranked or franked. Evidence of tax or imputation clienteles 
suggests that this may not be the case
39
.  
 CFG build on this paper by introducing Low Exercise Price Options
40
 (LEPOs) to their 
sample, and extending the period analysed to 1999. This increase in sampling, along with the growing 
liquidity in the ISF and LEPO markets results in a marked increase in the number of observations 
obtained. This, in addition to having a wider variety of firms and partially franked observations, 
mitigates some of the issues previously discussed and provides a much more accurate estimate of 
theta. They also improve on Twite and Wood’s (1997) modelling by acknowledging that imputation 
credits do not earn interest, and that transaction costs may create bounds around the equilibrium price, 
within which the price may fluctuate (Kalay, 1982). During the period 1994 – 1997 they find that 
imputation credits are priced in at 15% of their face value, and that theta is positively related to 
market capitalisation. The most important contribution from this study however, is that after the 
introduction of the 45-day rule the market value of imputation credits is found to be insignificantly 
different from zero, and the relationship of theta to dividend yield and market capitalisation becomes 
negative.  
Cannavan (2013) reuses this methodology to value imputation credits from 2000 – 2008 and 
produces a point estimate for theta of 17%. This change in value reflects the legislative change in 
2000 allowing tax-exempt individuals and institutions (such as superannuation funds) to refund excess 
or unused imputation credits. SFG (2013b) also reproduce the CFG study from 2000, but extend their 
sample to 2013, as well as conduct additional stability tests to remove outliers and ensure robustness. 
They estimate theta to equal 12%.  
All three of these studies have used almost identical methodology, varying only in their use of 
sample periods, and have found imputation credits to be valued between 0% and 17% of their face 
value of the past ~16 years. Twite and Wood (1997) find a significantly higher value of 45%, however 
their estimates are less reliable due to their relatively smaller sample size and less sophisticated 
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 See Jun, Gallagher and Partington (2011) 
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 These are effectively identical to futures contracts 
29 
 
modelling. These papers therefore provide strong evidence that imputation credits are significantly 
undervalued in the prices of ISF and LEPO contracts from the perspective of domestic investors, and 
that this situation potentially provides profitable arbitrage opportunities to ‘small shareholders’ who 
are able to utilise imputation credits. CFG argue that this is a result of the marginal investor being 
predominantly foreign. If this is the case the value of imputation credits priced into ISFs and LEPOs 
is dependent on the ability of foreign investors to transfer credits to domestic ones in exchange for a 
portion of its face value. This means that theta, and in turn the profitability of arbitrage opportunities, 
should be significantly impacted by legislation aiming at preventing these transfer schemes, 
depending on how successful they are.  
Obviously the estimates from these studies are significantly lower than those produced from 
the drop-off studies previously discussed. We believe these differences may result from two things. 
First, the benefits of the simultaneous pricing method listed at the beginning of this section result in a 
more accurate measure of theta. Due to both securities being traded simultaneously, arbitrage methods 
contain no risk, and therefore require less of a deviation in equilibrium price to induce arbitrageurs to 
enter the market. This results in prices remaining closer to their equilibriums, and therefore more 
accurately reflecting the long term price of imputation credits. Second, the sample of firms used in the 
futures studies, are systematically different from those used in drop-off studies. Only the 30 largest 
and most heavily traded firms on the ASX have available futures contracts that are actively trading, 
and are therefore the only firms included in the samples of these studies. In contrast, drop-off studies 
usually include all firms that are actively traded and paying dividends. It is possible that these 30 large 
firms have higher foreign ownership, and are more likely to have a foreign marginal investor. This 
would in turn push down the average value of imputation credits for those 30 firms, relative to the 
ASX as a whole. Even if this is the case, it is not entirely relevant for this proposed thesis, but is 
important to keep in mind when interpreting the results and estimates of the two different types of 
studies.  
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4. Hypothesis Development 
4.1. Valuing Imputation Credits 
4.1.1. Hypothesis 1.1 
The prior simultaneous pricing literature values imputation credits by taking an average of the 
implicit values of theta observed across all futures transactions. There are three classes of investors 
who are active enough within the market that they may influence the implicit values of theta: (1) 
foreign long-term investors; (2) domestic long-term investors; (3) domestic short-term investors (or 
dividend arbitrageurs). If the first type of investor is marginal during all of the observed transactions, 
then the estimate of theta should equal zero. If the second type of investor is marginal during all of the 
observed transactions, then the estimate of theta should equal close to its face value. If the third type 
of investor is marginal during all of the observed transactions, then the estimate of theta should equal 
its face value less the transaction costs incurred while conducting the arbitrage strategy. However, if 
different classes of investor are marginal within the futures markets at different times, then the 
estimate of theta should equal a weighted-average of each of their individual values of theta. 
Prior literature has consistently estimated theta to be located somewhere between zero and 
one. This suggests that various classes of investors are dominant within the futures market at different 
points in time; and current estimates of theta represent a weighted average of the values of theta 
across these different classes of investors. Therefore, we expect the average implicit value of theta 
across all futures quotes to be a small positive number. 
Hypothesis 1.1: The average value of theta reflected in all futures quotes will be positive 
4.1.2. Hypothesis 1.2 
As a futures contract nears ex-dividend and maturity, the borrowing costs faced by 
arbitrageurs declines, and the profitability of dividend-capturing increases exponentially. 
Consequently, dividend-capturers increasingly engage in the futures contract in the days and weeks 
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preceding the ex-dividend date. If this activity is large enough, they may dominate the market, thereby 
temporarily becoming the price-setting marginal investor around the ex-dividend date.  
Three pieces of evidence suggest that dividend-capturing activity is significant enough to 
impact the value of theta around the ex-dividend date: (1) the level of open interest in futures 
contracts associated with franked dividends increases dramatically in the days preceding the ex-
dividend date (Twite and Wood, 1997); (2) some managed funds use dividend-stripping at their sole 
trading style. Targeting stocks paying large franked dividends, these funds purchase shares a few 
weeks before the ex-dividends date and use futures contracts to partially hedge their positions, while 
ensuring that they abide by the 45-day rule
41
; (3) the 45-day rule was introduced with the specific 
purpose of preventing dividend-capturing arbitrage. The introduction of this regulation should have 
had no material effect on long-term investors, whose investment style already abides by the 
regulations. Yet CFG document that the introduction of this legislation dramatically reduced the value 
of theta priced into futures contracts. This suggests that the arbitrageurs who were primarily affected 
by this legislation had some form of influence over the value of theta reflected in futures prices.   
Hypothesis 1.2: Dividend-capturing activity will influence the prices of futures contracts, and bid up 
the implicit values of theta around the ex-dividend date.  
4.1.3. Hypothesis 1.3 
We are most interested in the value long-term providers of equity place on a dollar of 
imputation credits. It is this value of theta that is incorporated into the WACC model, and in turn 
influences firm value. Therefore, if we focus on subsections of our sample where arbitrageurs are not 
active in the market, and long-term investors are most likely to be marginal, we are able to estimate 
this value clearly. 
As Australia is a small open economy, our cost of capital is set by the world rate, and the 
marginal long-term investor is likely to be foreign. Therefore, foreign long-term investors are likely to 
be the marginal investor within futures market during normal times. When we focus on observations 
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 An example is the Aurora Dividend Income Trust (AOD) that uses dividend stripping as its sole investment 
style. The fund purchases large blue-chip stocks a few weeks out from the ex-dividend date, and hedges its 
positions by 50% (previously around 65%) using futures contracts. 
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that are not influenced by arbitrageurs near the ex-dividend date, we expect the observed values of 
theta to equal zero.  
Hypothesis 1.3: The marginal long-term investor derives no value from imputation credits, and the 
measure of theta incorporated into the cost of equity equals zero. 
4.2. Profitability of Trading Strategy 
4.2.1. Hypothesis 2.1 
Prior papers have consistently estimated that imputation credits are priced into futures 
contracts at far below their face value.  Whether or not this presents arbitrage profits is dependent on 
whether the size of unvalued portion of the gross dividend is enough to cover the higher transaction 
and borrowing costs incurred by a small, individual investor. Due to the estimates of theta in these 
futures ranging between extremely low values (0% and 17%) over the past 20 years, we believe the 
arbitrage strategy will present significantly profitable opportunities to a domestic individual.  
Hypothesis 2.1: The trading strategy will present significantly profitable opportunities for a small 
domestic investor 
4.2.2. Hypothesis 2.2 
By definition, the profitability of the arbitrage strategy is determined by the prevailing futures 
and share price relative to one another, the size of the cash dividend and associated imputation credit, 
and the transaction and borrowing costs incurred by the strategy.  
Any factor that increases cash inflows – such as the price of the futures contract, the size of 
the dividend, or the size of the imputation credit – is positively related to profitability, while any 
factor that increases cash outflows – such as the share price, borrowing costs, or transaction costs – is 
negatively related to profitability. 
In light of this fact, our hypothesised relationships between profitability and futures/stock 
attributes are displayed in Table V. 
. 
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Table V 
Stock and futures characteristics and expected relationships 
Hypothesis Stock or futures characteristic Expected 
H2.2.1 Dividend yield + 
H2.2.2 Franking Percentage + 
H2.2.3 Bid-ask spread of shares and futures − 
H2.2.4 Interest rate differential − 
H2.2.5 Time-to-maturity ? 
   
A share’s dividend yield and franking percentage determine the size of the gross dividend, 
relative to the initial capital outlay and transaction costs incurred. We therefore expect each of them to 
be positively related to profitability. The bid-ask spread of both the futures contract and underlying 
share represent one form of transaction costs. As spreads increase, so do the size of transaction costs 
relative to dividend payoffs. We therefore expect these two variables to be negatively related to 
profitability. The interest rate differential refers to the difference between the margin lending rate and 
the applicable risk-free rate at the time of observation. If futures prices are determined by investors 
who can borrow at the risk-free rate, then investors who borrow at higher rates will receive less of the 
unvalued portion of imputation credits when using arbitrage strategies. Therefore we expect that a 
larger different between these two rates to be negatively related to profitability.  
Time-to-maturity refers to the difference between the date of observation and date at which 
the contract matures. The larger this variable is, the longer the arbitrage position must be held open. 
This in turn increases borrowing costs and reduces profitability. From this perspective, we expect 
time-to-maturity to be negatively related to profitability. However, if we find that dividend-capturing 
activity influences the pricing of futures contracts, then as a contract nears maturity arbitrageurs may 
increasingly enter into trades, thus bidding up the implicit value of theta. This in turn reduces the 
portion of the imputation credit that is unvalued, and indirectly reduces profitability. From this 
perspective, we would expect that time-to-maturity would be positively related to profitability. We 
therefore create two opposing hypotheses to determine this relationship. 
Hypothesis 2.2.1: Profitability is positively related to the dividend yield. 
Hypothesis 2.2.2: Profitability is positively related to the franking percentage. 
Hypothesis 2.2.3: Profitability is negatively related to the relative bid-ask spreads. 
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Hypothesis 2.2.4: Profitability is negatively related the interest rate differential 
Hypothesis 2.2.5a: Profitability is negatively related to the time-to-maturity of an observation 
Hypothesis 2.2.5b: Profitability is positively related to the time-to-maturity of an observation 
4.2.3. Hypothesis 2.3 
Two changes to the imputation system were made during our sample period that we 
hypothesise have had a significant impact on the profitability of our trading strategy. The first is the 
introduction of the 45-day rule. As this rule was aimed at preventing large institutions from 
undertaking dividend-capturing arbitrage, this regulatory change doesn’t directly affect our trading 
strategy. However, as CFG and Beggs and Skeels (2006) show, this change did have a significant 
downward impact on market value of imputation credits. By increasing the unvalued portion of 
imputation credits in futures contracts, we expect that this regulatory change indirectly increased the 
profitability of the strategy.  
The second relevant change involved allowing investors to redeem surplus franking credits 
for cash. The main beneficiaries of this change were tax-exempt superannuation funds, who were 
previously unable to utilise imputation credits. While this change does not directly impact the 
arbitrage strategy being analysed, it may have indirectly affected its profitability by influencing the 
market value of imputation credits. By allowing a larger number of domestic investors to utilise 
imputation credits, this may have put upward pressure on the value of theta. If this is the case, we 
would therefore expect the profitability of the arbitrage strategy to decrease.  
Hypothesis 2.3.1: The introduction of the 45-day rule increased profitability. 
Hypothesis 2.3.2: Allowing investors to redeem surplus franking credits reduced profitability. 
4.2.4. Hypothesis 2.4 
Our initial analysis of the arbitrage trading strategy contains some assumptions that do not 
hold in reality. The first major assumption of this type, is that the representative investor has 
unlimited borrowing capacity and no collateral requirements. In reality, margin lending accounts limit 
borrowing to a percentage of the overall position entered into, and the remainder of the position must 
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be funded by the individuals own capital. Despite the arbitrage strategy being risk-free, the margin 
loans are lent at high fixed rates regardless of the investment activity being undertaken. Therefore, we 
are able to discount invested capital at the applicable risk free rate, which is significantly lower than 
the margin rate that borrowings are discounted at. As a result, relaxing the capital requirement 
assumption should reduce the representative investors weighted cost of capital, and in turn increase 
profitability. 
We relax another assumption present in the initial analysis by incorporating the actual 
brokerage fees charged when using a Commsec margin lending account to enter into, and close out, 
the arbitrage strategy. These include brokerage fees for shorting the futures contract and purchasing 
the underlying shares, and additional fees for executing the futures contract at maturity. The initial 
brokerage fees are charged as a percentage of the total position entered into
42
, while the execution fees 
are charged at a fixed amount per futures contract executed. Incorporating this transaction fees will 
undoubtedly reduce the profitability of the arbitrage strategy. Because the brokerage fees applicable 
are quite modest relative to the profitability observed in preliminary results, we expect that the 
strategy remains significantly profitable after incorporating transaction costs and collateral 
requirements. 
Hypothesis 2.4: The arbitrage strategy will remain profitable when using realistic examples that 
incorporate explicit transaction costs and collateral requirements 
5. Valuation and Profitability Framework 
In the following section we provide a brief overview of the ISF and LEPO contracts that will 
be central to this thesis’ analysis, before outlining the cost-of-carry no-arbitrage framework that will 
be used to value them. As mentioned previously, part of this valuation includes the anticipated share 
price drop-off on the ex-dividend day, and therefore provides a method of measuring the market value 
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 For example 5 futures contracts that each allow an investor to purchase 100 underlying shares at a price of 
$20 each would represent a total position value of: 5 ∗ 100 ∗ $20 = $10,000. Brokerage fees would then be 
calculated as a percentage of this total value.  
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of the share’s associated dividend and imputation credit. We then outline the arbitrage strategy that is 
central to this thesis, and provide the model that will be used to calculate its profitability.    
5.1. ISF and LEPO contracts 
Individual share futures (ISFs) are derivative contracts that provide an agreement between 
two parties to trade an underlying share in the future for a predetermined price. These contracts were 
traded on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) from 1994 to 2008, and were available only for the 
largest and most actively traded stocks on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Each ISF contract is 
typically written on 100 of the underlying shares, and traders incur transaction fees at the creation of 
the contract (Brokerage fees) and at its execution regardless of the delivery method used. Initially, 
most contracts were settled in cash (with no transfer of the underlying asset), but over time have 
shifted to physical delivery. 
Low exercise price options (LEPOs) are call options written on underlying shares that have 
extremely low exercise prices, typically of one cent. This means they are always executed, and unlike 
other options, the contract premium isn’t actually paid until maturity. This makes LEPOs identical to 
futures contracts for all intents and purposes. These contracts were introduced in 1995, and continue 
to be traded on the ASX to this day. Similar to ISF’s, the contracts are often written on 100 shares, are 
only available for the largest and most heavily traded stocks, and incur transaction costs both at 
creation and execution. At this point in time, LEPOs are unable to be settled in cash, and must involve 
the physical delivery of the underlying asset. 
5.2. Valuing theta  
In this section we use the standard cost-of-carry no-arbitrage framework, outlined in  CFG, to 
develop a formula for the valuation of a futures contract. We use this framework to derive an average 
estimate of theta across all observations, and to also create a theta variable that can be estimated for 
each individual as well as estimates of theta for each individual futures observation. We also extend 
their model in three ways. First, we use bid-ask quotes rather than recent transaction prices to reflect 
the actual prices faced by investors wishing to purchase and sell the securities. Second, we relax two 
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assumptions made in CFG: that the cash dividend is received on the ex-dividend date, and the 
imputation credit is redeemed for cash at the expiration date. Instead, we incorporate the actual date 
the cash dividend is received – the payment date – and the imputation credit is redeemed – the end of 
the financial year in which the payment date falls within. Third, in later analysis, and when creating 
the theta variable for all individual observations, we assume that the market value of cash dividends is 
a fixed percentage of their face value. Assuming futures contracts are, on average, not mispriced, any 
remaining residual is attributable to the market value of the IC; which, relative to the face value of the 
IC, provides an estimate of theta. This method, coupled with the huge increase in sample size, 
provides greater flexibility in valuing theta across different firms and time periods. It also mitigates 
any potential estimation errors stemming from a lack of variation in franking percentages – which is a 
necessary attribute when estimating both the cash and IC components simultaneously.  
The model developed acts to value an ISF or LEPO contract at time 𝑡1, using the payoffs 
faced by a representative investor that faces the same taxes on dividends as on capital gains. Although 
long-term capital gains (greater than 12 months) are given preferential tax treatment in Australia, the 
relative short-term nature of futures contracts eliminate this tax discount, and effectively result in a 
homogenous tax rate of 𝜏𝑝 for both forms of income
43
. The timeline displayed in Figure I provides the 
relevant dates (and their notation) for the valuation model used 
 
Figure I: Timeline of relevant dates. For an observed futures and share price to be kept as an observation it must be the case 
that 𝑡5 > 𝑡4 > 𝑡2 > 𝑡1. However, due to the lag between the date of ex-dividend, and the date at which the dividend is 
actually paid, time 𝑡3 may fall before or after the execution date 𝑡4, but will always fall before EOFY at time 𝑡5. 
 
 
Where 𝑡1 is the date at which the share is purchased or the futures contract is entered into, 𝑡2 
is the ex-dividend date, 𝑡3 is the date at which the dividend and imputation credit are received, 𝑡4 is 
the date at which the forward contract expires and the share is sold, 𝑡5 is the end of financial year, or 
when ICs are redeemed and taxes are paid.  
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 Observations with a time-to-maturity (𝑡4 − 𝑡1) greater than 12 months are eliminated to ensure this is the case 
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We define 𝐹𝑡1 as the price for a future at time 𝑡1 that matures at time 𝑡4, and 𝑋𝑡4 as the futures 
strike price at time 𝑡4 – which equals $0.01 for LEPO contracts and $0.00 for ISF contracts. We 
define 𝑆𝑡1 as the share price at time 𝑡1, and 𝑆𝑡4 as the share price at time 𝑡4. We define 𝐷𝑡3 and 𝐼𝐶𝑡3 as 
the cash dividend and imputation credit respectively, both of which are received at time 𝑡3. 𝛼𝑠 is the 
round-trip transaction cost associated with the share, and 𝛼𝑓 is the round-trip transaction costs 
associated with the future. Finally, 𝑟 is the continuously compounding risk-free rate of interest. The 
superscript attached to share and futures prices represent what type of quote is being used, such that: 𝑎 
represents an ask quote; 𝑏 represents a bid quote; and 𝑚 represents a mid-quote equalling an average 
of the simultaneous bid and ask quotes
44
.  
Within the standard no-arbitrage framework there are two methods of obtaining ownership of 
a share at time 𝑡4. Since both of these methods involve a single net cash flow at time 𝑡4, for the 
marginal investor to be indifferent between the two methods the net cash flows must equal. 
Method 1: Physical Replication 
Under this method the investor borrows 𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 and uses this money to buy the share at it’s ask 
price at time 𝑡1. He then receives a dividend of 𝐷𝑡3and imputation credit of 𝐼𝐶𝑡3 at time 𝑡3. The 
dividend can be deposited in an interest bearing account making it equal 𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) at time 𝑡4, 
whereas the imputation credit is unable to be redeemed until 𝑡5, making its value at 𝑡4 equal 
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4). The share can then be sold at the bid price at time 𝑡4, allowing the investor to 
receive 𝑆𝑡4
𝑏 . The investor then repays the loan and its accrued interest of  𝑆𝑡4
𝑎 𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1). Transaction 
costs are also incurred with a time 𝑡4 value of (𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑠). As the tax rates on dividends and capital 
gains are the same, any net cash flow from this entire transaction is taxed at a rate of 𝜏𝑝𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) (the 
discounting accounts for the fact that taxes incurred are not paid until period 𝑡5).  
We use 𝜙 to denote the value of one dollar of imputation credits paid to the investor, and refer 
to this measure as ‘theta’ in line with the prior literature. We use 𝛿 to denote the value of one dollar of 
cash dividends paid to the investor, which we refer to as ‘delta’. 
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 For example: 𝐹𝑡1
𝑎  would be a futures’ ask quote at time 𝑡1, 𝑆𝑡4
𝑏  would be a share’s bid quote at time 𝑡4, and 𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 
would be a share’s mid quote equalling [(𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 + 𝑆𝑡1
𝑏 )/2] at time 𝑡1. 
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This results in an after-tax net cash flow of:  
 [𝑆𝑡4
𝑏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) + 𝜙𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) − 𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − (𝛼𝑠𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 + 𝛼𝑠𝑆𝑡4
𝑏 )](1 − 𝜏𝑝𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)) (11) 
   
Method 2: Forward Contract 
Under this method the investor purchases a forward contract at time 𝑡1that allows the investor 
to purchase the underlying share at a predetermined amount of 𝐹𝑎 at time 𝑡4. The contract does not 
entitle the owner to the share’s associated dividend or imputation credit. At time 𝑡4 the investor settles 
the forward contract, paying the forward price of 𝐹𝑡1
𝑎  as well as the exercise price of 𝑋𝑡4 in exchange 
for the share. This position can then be closed out by selling the share at the prevailing bid quote at 
time 𝑡4 which is 𝑆𝑡4
𝑏 . Round-trip transaction costs are also incurred with a 𝑡4 value of (𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑠). 
Following this, any net cash flow is taxed at a rate of 𝜏𝑝𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4). This results in an after-tax cash 
flow of: 
 [𝑆𝑡4
𝑏 − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑎 − 𝑋𝑡4 − (𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑠)](1 − 𝜏𝑝𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)) (12) 
   
 Therefore, for the representative investor to be indifferent between the two payoffs, it must 
be the case that: 
 𝐹𝑡1
𝑎 + 𝑋𝑡4 + (𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑠) = 𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝛿𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) − 𝜙𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) + (𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑠) (13) 
   
And for this relationship to hold, the theoretical futures price must equal: 
 𝐹𝑡1
𝑎 = 𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝛿𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) − 𝜙𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) − 𝑋𝑡4 + (𝛼𝑠 − 𝛼𝑓) (14) 
   
If this analysis is repeated for a seller rather than a buyer, bid quotes change to ask quotes and 
vice versa, and the sign on the transaction cost term reverses; Such that the theoretical futures bid 
quote should equal: 
 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏 = 𝑆𝑡1
𝑏 𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝛿𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) − 𝜙𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) − 𝑋𝑡4 − (𝛼𝑠 − 𝛼𝑓) (15) 
   
Where (𝛼𝑠 − 𝛼𝑓) represents the transaction cost differential. If we repeat this analysis for a 
seller rather than a buyer, this sign on this term reverses. By assuming the transaction cost component 
is not significant, and by exploiting the following two relationships: 𝐹𝑚 = [(𝐹𝑎 + 𝐹𝑏)/2]; and 𝑆𝑚 =
[(𝑆𝑎 + 𝑆𝑏)/2]; we can reduce these two simultaneous equations to: 
 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 = 𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝛿𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) − 𝜙𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) − 𝑋𝑡4 (16) 
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This relationship is used as the main equation for determining the theoretical futures price, 
and for determining the market value of cash dividends and imputation credits in the initial analysis. 
The use of mid quotes also has the added benefit of avoiding any biases stemming from the bid-ask 
bounce that’s present when using transaction prices. As transactions often fall towards either the bid 
or ask price, the observed prices would fall either side of the equilibrium price. Therefore, if a bid-ask 
bounce effect is significant it may systematically bias the level of mispricing upwards, and result in a 
less accurate estimate of delta and theta. 
In further analysis, we assume that the cash component of the dividend is priced into futures 
contracts at a fixed percentage of its face value, and that this value doesn’t vary between firms or time 
periods. We refer to this percentage, or the market value of a dollar of cash dividends, as delta (𝛿). By 
making this assumption all of the relevant variables, other than theta, are known, and the equation can 
be reduced to the following: 
 𝜙𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) = 𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4 − 𝛿𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) (17) 
   
By dividing the equation through the face value of the imputation credit at time 𝑡4 we are able 
to determine an estimate of theta as follows: 
 𝜙 =
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4 − 𝛿𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
 (18) 
   
This value is therefore able to be estimated for every futures observation that is collected. We 
use these individual estimates in later regression analyses to determine whether a relation exists 
between this variable and the profitability of the trading strategy.   
5.3. Arbitrage model 
In this section we develop the modelling for the costly dividend-stripping trading strategy 
undertaken by a domestic individual investor. We form the model based on the following assumptions 
for the representative investor: (1) they are domestic residents for tax purposes and are able to derive 
the full value from any imputation credits received, up to a value of $5,000; (2) they are performing 
the trading strategy using a margin lending account and are therefore borrowing at the margin loan 
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rate; (3) The trading strategy is a form of deterministic arbitrage and is therefore risk free, thus the 
individual’s discount rate is equal to the risk free rate of interest; (4) The bid-ask spread is the only 
transaction cost incurred by the individual; (5) No collateral requirements exist and the investor has 
unlimited borrowing capacity
45
; (6) All security purchases are made at the prevailing ask price, and 
sales at the prevailing bid price. The notation remains the same as before, however, due to both theta 
and delta equalling one in this instance, we omit both 𝜙 and 𝛿 from the equations. We introduce 𝑚 as 
the continuously compounding margin loan rate at which the individual investor can borrow at. 
Under the dividend stripping trading strategy a domestic investor borrows 𝑆𝑡1
𝑎  and uses the 
funds to purchase a share at the ask price at time 𝑡1. While doing this, he simultaneously sells a 
futures contract for a price of 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏  that expires at time 𝑡4. However, no money changes hands until the 
futures contract matures. At time 𝑡3 the investor receives a dividend payment of 𝐷𝑡3 and an 
imputation credit of 𝐼𝐶𝑡3. The dividend can be deposited into an interest bearing account making it 
equal 𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑑(𝑡4−𝑡3) at time 𝑡4, whereas the imputation credit is unable to be redeemed until 𝑡5, making 
its value at time 𝑡4 equal to 𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑑(𝑡5−𝑡4). At time 𝑡4 the futures contract is exercised and settled 
through physical delivery, allowing the investor to receive 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏  for the share, and an exercise price of 
𝑋𝑡4. The proceeds are then used to repay the loan and interest of 𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 𝑒𝑚(𝑡4−𝑡1). Any net cash flow from 
the transaction is taxed at a rate of 𝜏𝑝𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4). The before-tax profit of 𝜋 is therefore calculated as  
 𝜋 = 𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) + 𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) − (𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 𝑒𝑚(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏 − 𝑋𝑡4) (19) 
   
The profit variable can also be viewed as a percentage of the capital outlay by dividing the 
entire equation by the price initially paid for the share: 
 
𝜋
𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 =
𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) + 𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) − (𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 𝑒𝑚(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏 − 𝑋𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑎  (20) 
   
This method provides a measure of relative profitability, and is more appropriate for the 
comparison of observations. In addition, because the trade is entered into at the date of the 
observation, and is closed when the futures contract expires, the period in which the position must be 
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 Assumptions (4) and (5) are relaxed in later analysis 
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held is equal to the ‘time-to-maturity’ of the contract (𝑡4 − 𝑡1), and varies between observations. This 
can reduce the comparability of observations under certain circumstances. Under the current 
assumptions: that no collateral requirements exist and no individual capital is invested in the strategy, 
there is no opportunity cost of undertaking the strategy and therefore the time-to-maturity is irrelevant 
for comparing profitable observations. However, when we later relax this assumption and account for 
the investment of an individual’s own capital, an opportunity cost does exist, and the length of time 
that the capital is tied up is important. To account for this we introduce another measure to convert the 
profitability into monthly returns:  
 𝜋𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =
𝜋
𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 ∗
30
(𝑡4 − 𝑡1)
 (21) 
   
 
6. Data Description 
6.1. Data Sources and Sample Construction 
The sample consists of all bid and ask quotes submitted for ISFs and LEPOs during the period 
1 January 1996 to 30 June 2014. Although ISFs began trading in 1994 and LEPOs began trading in 
1995, data is only available from 1 January 1996 onwards. Other than these combined three years that 
are unavailable, this sample encompasses the entire period that these two types of contracts have 
traded. Bid and ask quotes for the derivative contracts and their underlying shares are obtained from 
the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). While there are usually at least two 
futures contracts for each stock trading simultaneously, trading predominantly occurs in the contract 
that is nearest to maturity. In addition to this, the small risks that are faced by arbitrageurs – including 
dividend uncertainty and interest rate volatility – increase with the distance-to-maturity, meaning this 
variable is positively related to the relative mispricing of a contract (or deviations from its theoretical 
price). For these reason, as well as their relative illiquidity, observations with a distance-to-maturity 
greater than 364 days are excluded from the sample. As mentioned previously this also removes any 
observations where futures prices may reflect a discounted capital gains tax.  
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Similar to prior research, every futures observation must be matched to a contemporaneous 
share price observation. We do this by first creating an average of bid and ask quotes that occur within 
one minute intervals for both shares and futures. Because our analysis requires mid-quotes, any 
observations without both an average bid and ask price for a one minute interval are deleted. A mid 
quote variable is then calculated using an average of the average bid and ask quotes for each interval. 
This also allows for the measurement of both the share’s and futures’ bid-ask spreads for each 
observation
46
.  
Each futures security is then matched with its corresponding reference data – including 
expiration data, strike price, and underlying share – which must be obtained separately from SIRCA. 
Regular reference data is only available from 2008 onwards, and therefore reference changes data was 
used to recreate the reference data from the preceding years. However, the reference changes data 
contains significant erroneous observations, and doesn’t include changes in the futures’ underlying 
shares. The latter issue was solved by trimming the description variable (which provides the name of 
the futures contract) and hand-checking that each created variable accurately reflected the underlying 
share’s ticker symbol. To ensure this method was robust, testing was recreated from 2008 using both 
the normal references data and the manually created reference changes data, and the results of each 
were compared. Both methods produced almost the same sample size and virtually identical results; 
suggesting that the manual reference method is as accurate as the regular method.  
Any futures observations with missing reference data were deleted. Additionally, any share or 
futures observations with a negative bid-ask spread, or a relative bid-ask spread greater than the 99
th
 
percentile were truncated
47
. These deletions only make up a small portion of the observations; 
however, the majority pertain to errors in the data – such as misplaced decimal places in quotes – 
rather than extremely illiquid securities. These refinements leave of a total of 16.8 million futures 
observations over the entire sample period, with 3.5 million stemming from LEPO quotes, and the 
remaining 13.3 million from ISF quotes. 
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 Of the observations collected the median bid-ask spread relative to the prevailing mid quote is 60.9 bps for all 
futures and 10.7 bps for their underlying shares; reflecting the relative illiquidity of the two futures markets 
relative to the share market.  
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 This equated to futures and shares with a relative bid-ask spread (RBAS) greater than ~15%.  
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Futures quotes are then merged with the contemporaneous quotes that occur within the same 
one minute interval in their underlying shares. As mentioned previously, any observations with a 
time-to-maturity greater than 364 days are deleted to ensure homogeneity in tax rates between the two 
types of securities, and observations with an expiration date later than 1 Sep 2014 are deleted – as this 
is when the dividend data was initially collected – and observations that have a payment date after 30 
June 2014 are deleted.   
Dividend data, including the cash amount, franking percentage, and relevant dates 
(announcement, ex-date, and payment date) are sourced from Morningstar’s Data Analysis. We 
assume that all dividend and franking information is known at the time of the futures observation, 
regardless of whether it is before the announcement date. Ex-dividend dates, dividend amounts and 
franking percentages have been shown to be consistently predictable by the market, therefore making 
this a fair assumption. This is also consistent with prior literature, however some papers also remove 
observations prior to the announcement date to ensure robustness, and find no significant change in 
results (CFG; Cannavan, 2013; SFG, 2013). However, to ensure this assumption is robust, we create a 
new variable that measures the percentage change in the cash dividend that occurs from one year to 
the next, in dividends of the same type (i.e. interim, final or special). This variable is employed in 
Section 7.1.2 in order to control for unexpected changes in dividends that may not have been 
accurately predicted by the market, and therefore not accurately priced into the futures observation.  
We also assume that imputation credits are converted to cash (redeemed) at the end of the 
financial year in which the dividend and credit are received. It’s important to note that the financial 
year in which the dividend income is assessable is determined by the year in which the payment date 
falls within, not the ex-dividend date
48
. Therefore, the payment date also dictates which regulatory 
period and observations falls within. A small number of dividends are paid in foreign currencies; 
either in United States dollars (USD), New Zealand dollars (NZL), or Singaporean dollars (SIN). 
Dividends paid in USD and NZL are converted to Australian dollars (AUD) using the prevailing 
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 For example, if the ex-dividend date is 29 June 2013, and the payment date is 7 July 2013, the dividend 
income would be part of the 2014 financial year. Therefore the imputation credit would be redeemed 30 June 
2014.  
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exchange rate on their respective payment dates, while dividends paid in SIN, and there associated 
futures observations, are deleted.
49
 We also delete observations with two or more dividends, or a 
special dividend, prior to maturity.  
Interest rates are supplied by Thomson Reuters’ Datastream on behalf of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) and are used as proxies for the risk-free rate of interest. Following CFG, we use the 
RBA 11am Cash Rate, the RBA 30-day Dealers’ Bill Rate, the RBA 90-day Dealers’ Bill Rate, and 
the RBA 180-day Dealers’ Bill Rate for the entire sample period. The appropriate risk-free rate is 
chosen based on which of these rates has a maturity that matches closest to the time-to-maturity 
(TTM) of a futures observation. The cash rate is used when TTM is less than or equal to 15 days; the 
30-day rate is used when TTM is between 16 and 60 days; the 90-day rate is used when TTM is 
between 61 and 120 days; and the 180-day rate is used when TTM is greater than 120 days. 
Margin lending rates are supplied by Datastream on behalf of the RBA. The data provided by 
the RBA consists of monthly averages of the margin lending rates provided by the five largest 
Australian banks. We use this measure as a proxy for what a domestic investor using a margin lending 
account would realistically borrow at. This data, however, is only available from January 2001 
onwards. To remedy this, we observe that the margin lending rates closely follow the RBA cash rate 
throughout the entire sample period, with the spread between the two equalling 2.75% (with a 
standard deviation of 57 bps) between 2001 and 2008. In the years prior to 2001 we assume that these 
two rates would have closely followed each other, and we make the conservative estimate that the 
margin lending rate would have been 3% higher than the RBA cash rate throughout that period. It’s 
also worth noting that both the risk-free and margin lending rates obtained from the RBA are provided 
as an annually compounding percentage. For their use in the cost-of-carry no-arbitrage formula 
outlined earlier they must be converted to a continually compounding annual rate. We do this by 
taking the natural log of the original rates.
50
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 These Singaporean dividends belong to one company, and are only associated with 45 futures observations.  
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 The specific conversion formula used is: 
𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 = ln (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙) 
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Of the remaining observations 4,454,784 have no dividend events prior to maturity. We 
remove these observations from our main sample, but use them to demonstrate the accuracy of the 
costly no-arbitrage in predicting market prices in Section 7.1.1. This leaves us with our final sample 
of 2,516,247 observations with one dividend event prior to maturity. Of these, 94,010 are associated 
with an unfranked dividend. The sample construction process is summarised in Table VI. 
Table VI 
Sample Construction 
Panel A: Data Filters 
All LEPO bid-ask quotes submitted between 1 Jan 1996 and 31 July 2014  13,518,371 
Create averages of bid and ask quotes that occur within one minute of each other (8,510,260) 5,008,111 
Less: Observations without a simultaneous bid and ask quote (1,156,900) 3,851,211 
Less: Average quotes with a negative bid-ask spread (133) 3,851,078 
Less: Index observations (310,663) 3,540,415 
Less: Observations with missing reference data (91,451) 3,448,964 
Less: Observations with a relative bid-ask spread greater than 15% (19,159) 3,429,805 
   
All ISF bid-ask quotes submitted between 1 Jan 1996 and 31 Dec 2008  60,881,565 
Create averages of bid and ask quotes that occur within one minute of each other (41,311,623) 19,569,942 
Less: Observations without a simultaneous bid and ask quote (6,034,903) 16,533,988 
Less: Average quotes with a negative bid-ask spread (1,051) 13,533,988 
Less: Index observations (172,085) 13,361,903 
Less: Observations with missing reference data (8,182) 13,353,721 
Less: Observations with a relative bid-ask spread greater than 15% (4,001) 13,349,720 
   
Total cleaned futures quotes (ISF + LEPO)  16,779,525 
   
Merge with contemporaneous equity quotes (9,025,000) 7,754,525 
Less: Observations with a time-to-maturity greater than 364 days (2,430) 7,752,095 
Less: Observations with a maturity after 1 September 2014 (4,088) 7,748,007 
Less: Observations with associated dividend in Singaporean dollars (45) 7,747,962 
Less: Observations with a payment date after 30 June 2014 (2,035) 7,745,927 
Less: Observations with two or more dividends, no dividends, or a ‘special’ dividend (5,397,098) 2,354,829 
   
Panel B: Final Samples 
Final observations with 1 dividend before maturity  2,354,829 
Final observations with 1 unfranked dividend before maturity  94,010 
Final observations with no dividends prior to maturity  4,454,784 
   
6.2. Descriptive Statistics 
We present the breakdown of final observations by firm in Table VII. Similar to prior studies, 
our sample is dominated by the largest, and most liquid stocks trading on the ASX, with the top 20 
firms listed comprising 93.8% of all futures observations. Observing that our final sample consists of 
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2.35 million observations over 788 ex-dividend events, we can see that the use of bid-ask quotes, 
rather than transaction prices, greatly increases the number of observations. Our sample can be 
compared to Cannavan (2013) who produces a sample of 10,325 observations for the period July 2000 
to Dec 2008, and SFG (2013b) who produce a sample of 52,041 observations for the period July 2000 
to March 2013.  
Table VII 
Descriptive Statistics: By Firm 
Firm Div. Events Observations Percent Firm Div. Events Observations Percent 
BHP 37 434,744 0.1768 MQG 13 19,830 0.0081 
NAB 36 264,343 0.1075 CCL 9 19,193 0.0078 
CBA 35 236,996 0.0964 AMC 18 19,051 0.0077 
WBC 32 221,133 0.0899 NCM 14 18,115 0.0074 
ANZ 35 172,776 0.0703 FXJ 14 13,178 0.0054 
RIO 27 159,012 0.0647 ANN 5 10,923 0.0044 
WPL 30 109,672 0.0446 ORI 7 7,761 0.0032 
WOW 32 91,743 0.0373 SRP 5 6,463 0.0026 
TLS 26 85,196 0.0346 AXA 6 5,615 0.0023 
WES 19 84,214 0.0342 CSR 17 4,439 0.0018 
SGB 9 76,566 0.0311 STO 16 4,147 0.0017 
AMP 25 56,850 0.0231 LEI 5 2,734 0.0011 
LLC 18 52,758 0.0215 AWC 11 1,801 0.0007 
QBE 15 48,448 0.0197 AGK 5 1,731 0.0007 
TAH 12 46,333 0.0188 OSH 9 1,513 0.0006 
RIN 7 39,272 0.0160 CSL 11 1,469 0.0006 
SUN 9 37,094 0.0151 PNI 8 1,448 0.0006 
QAN 20 31,895 0.0130 NBH 8 1,145 0.0005 
BLD 16 30,076 0.0122 Remaining 44 162 11,924 0.0048 
BSL 5 27,682 0.0113 Total 788 2,354,829 1.0000 
        
 
Table VIII displays the distribution of ex-dividend events and observations across financial 
years, along with the average dividend yield and imputation credit yield across all observations within 
that financial year. It also displays the company tax rate for each financial year, and shows a drop in 
this rate on 1 July 2000, and again on 1 July 2001. Keeping all other things constant, a drop in the 
company tax rate decreases the size of the imputation credit associated with a dividend. This is 
reflected in lower imputation credit yields from FY 2002 onwards. Average dividend yields range 
from 1.47% and 2.68%, with an average of 2.07%, and show no obvious long-term trend across the 
sample period. With the exception of FY2007 to FY2011 the number of dividend events captured 
each year has trended upwards, reflecting the increased number of firms with futures contracts 
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trading. The number of observations each year are highest between FY2003 and FY2008 – dropping 
off significantly after the onset of the GFC and the ceasing of ISF contracts trading in late 2008.    
Table VIII 
Descriptive Statistics: By Financial Year 
Financial Year Div. Events Observations Mean Div. Yield Company Tax Mean IC Yield 
FY 1996 6 4,666 0.0147 0.36 0.0082 
FY 1997 21 32,874 0.0259 0.36 0.0142 
FY 1998 23 27,232 0.0236 0.36 0.0128 
FY 1999 26 5,653 0.0210 0.36 0.0106 
FY 2000 23 4,443 0.0186 0.36 0.0091 
FY 2001 34 19,724 0.0192 0.34 0.0113 
FY 2002 43 3,960 0.0202 0.30 0.0082 
FY 2003 37 336,048 0.0198 0.30 0.0079 
FY 2004 56 626,753 0.0215 0.30 0.0090 
FY 2005 55 500,801 0.0213 0.30 0.0088 
FY 2006 45 416,341 0.0208 0.30 0.0083 
FY 2007 38 134,688 0.0164 0.30 0.0067 
FY 2008 33 129,244 0.0161 0.30 0.0067 
FY 2009 37 27,453 0.0228 0.30 0.0097 
FY 2010 39 23,380 0.0168 0.30 0.0061 
FY 2011 35 13,320 0.0206 0.30 0.0097 
FY 2012 57 62,519 0.0211 0.30 0.0084 
FY 2013 81 32,314 0.0268 0.30 0.0117 
FY 2014 99 57,870 0.0238 0.30 0.0103 
Entire Sample 788 2,354,829 0.0207 - 0.0086 
      
Table IX presents the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in our final sample. We 
define DIV_YIELD as a measure of the dividend yield of a future contracts’ associated dividend, and 
is calculated as the dividend per share scaled by the share’s prevailing mid-quote at the time of 
observation: 
 𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖 =
𝐷𝑡3
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 (22) 
   
Similarly, we define IC_YIELD as a measure of the imputation credit yield for a contracts 
associated dividend. We calculate it as the imputation credits per share scaled by the share’s 
prevailing mid-quote at the time of observation: 
 𝐼𝐶_𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖 =
𝐼𝐶𝑡5
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  (23) 
   
We define FRANKED as the percentage that an associated dividend is franked. TTM_DAYS 
is an observation’s time-to-maturity in days, measured as the difference between the date of 
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observation, and the date at which the futures contract expires (𝑡4 − 𝑡1). In later analysis we also use 
the measure TTM_MONTHS which is the same variable converted to a measure of months: (𝑡4 −
𝑡1)/30. 
F_RBAS and S_RBAS are defined as the future’s and share’s relative bid-ask spread at the 
time of observation. Both are measured as the difference in prevailing bid and ask quotes, scaled by 
the prevailing mid quote, such that: 
 𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆 = (𝐹𝑡1
𝑎 − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏 )/𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 (24) 
   
And,  
 𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆 = (𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 − 𝑆𝑡1
𝑏 )/𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 (25) 
   
MARGIN_RATE is margin lending rate provided by the RBA, and is calculated as a monthly 
average of the rates provided by the 5 largest Australian banks.  
Similar to prior studies we observe that over 75% of our sample is associated with fully 
franked dividends, with imputation credits as a portion of the share price averaging 86 bps over the 
sample. 50% of our observations have a time-to-maturity of between 84 and 160 days. While 
summary stats for this variable are not reported in prior literature, the fact that we use observations 
from all trading securities with a TTM of less than 364 days, rather than just those from the futures 
contract nearest to maturity, suggests that the average time-to-maturity of our sample is significantly 
larger than those of the prior literature. Expectedly, the average bid-ask spreads are significantly 
larger in futures quotes relative to share quotes, reflecting the different levels of liquidity in the two 
markets. Regardless, the bid-ask spreads of both securities remain small, with 75% of futures 
observations having a bid-ask spread of less than 68 bps.  
Table IX 
Descriptive Stats: By Variable 
Variable Mean 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. Std. Dev. 
DIV_YIELD 0.0207 0.0145 0.0221 0.0260 0.0072 
FRANKED 0.9183 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2349 
IC_YIELD 0.0086 0.0057 0.0090 0.0111 0.0034 
TTM_DAYS 122.03 84.00 126.00 160.00 50.35 
F_RBAS 0.0063 0.0030 0.0043 0.0068 0.0071 
S_RBAS 0.0010 0.0004 0.0007 0.0012 0.0009 
MARGIN_RATE 0.0777 0.0728 0.0774 0.0793 0.0056 
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7. Methodology, Results and Analysis 
7.1. Valuing dividends and imputation credits 
In this section we use the costly no-arbitrage formula developed in Section 5.2 to determine 
the market value of cash dividends and imputation credits. Section 7.1.1 demonstrates that futures 
contracts are priced according to the costly no-arbitrage formula, and also develops mispricing control 
variables for later analyses; Section 7.1.2 analyses the market value of cash dividends using 
observations with an unfranked dividend event; and Section 7.1.3 analyses the market value of 
imputation credits.  
7.1.1. Testing mispricing 
Following CFG and Cannavan (2013) we demonstrate that futures contracts are, on average, 
priced according to the costly no-arbitrage formula developed earlier. We do this by analysing the 
relative mispricing (𝑅𝑀𝑃) of observations without an ex-dividend event before maturity; where 
𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑖 is defined as the prevailing futures mid quote less the theoretical futures mid quote calculated in 
equation (16), scaled by the prevailing share mid quote at time 𝑡1: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃 =
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  (26) 
   
The 𝑅𝑀𝑃s of this subsample are plotted on a frequency distribution in Figure II to illustrate 
the frequency and severity of mispricing within the futures market. 
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Figure II: Frequency distribution of the relative mispricing of futures contracts without an ex-dividend event before 
maturity. The distribution encompasses the entire sample period – from 1 Jan 1996 to 30 June 2014 – and is composed of 
over 4.45 million observations.  
 
Figure II demonstrates that the mispricing of 4.45 million observations is tightly dispersed 
around zero and normally distributed. While the mean 𝑅𝑀𝑃 of 3.7 bps is significantly different from 
zero, it is a tiny fraction of the share price and is economically insignificant. In addition, with 90% of 
observations falling within -12 bps and 21 bps it is demonstrable that the costly no-arbitrage formula 
is accurate in pricing ISFs and LEPOs, and will therefore be useful for inferring the market values of 
dividends and imputation credits.  
Another point of analysis is to determine whether the use of bid-ask quotes in the costly no-
arbitrage formula has improved the estimates of market prices, relative to the formulas used in prior 
literature. To do this we restrict our sample to the period used in Cannavan (2013) – July 2000 to Dec 
2008 – and rerun the univariate analysis. The results display a mean 𝑅𝑀𝑃 of 4.2 bps, with 90% of 
observations falling within -10 bps and 20 bps; which can be compared to Cannavan (2013) which 
found a mean of 5 bps, and 90% of observations falling within -30 bps and 50 bps. This demonstrates 
that the use of bid-ask quotes does improve estimates of market values by reducing mispricing, but 
only marginally.   
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While on average the level of mispricing is not economically significant, unreported results 
show an obvious downward trend in mispricing, with the RMP distribution becoming much tighter 
and closer to zero in later years. Therefore, mispricing may play significant role in earlier years, and 
in certain securities.  
We test this by regressing the level of mispricing against the following variables: (1) time 
period; (2) time-to-maturity; (3) the futures’ bid-ask spread; (4) and the share’s bid-ask spread. The 
first variable indicates which period the observation occurred within, and will act to measure the long-
term trend in mispricing over the sample period. After viewing mispricing distributions across 
multiple years, there appears to be a long-term downward trend and we expect that later time periods 
will suffer from lower levels of mispricing. The second variable measures the length of time between 
the date of the observed quote and the futures’ expiration date (𝑡4 − 𝑡1). Cummings and Frino (2011) 
show that the level of interest rate risk faced by arbitrageurs increases with time-to-maturity, resulting 
in larger price divergences being necessary to compensate arbitrageurs for their incurred risk. This 
variable should therefore be positively related to the level of mispricing. Bid-ask spreads are an 
integral variable for three reasons. First, they represent one form of implicit transaction costs, which 
create boundaries around the equilibrium price in which the actual price can fluctuate without 
presenting arbitrage opportunities (Kalay, 1982). Second, spreads also provide a measure of liquidity 
(Ding and Charoenwong, 2003), and can therefore act as a proxy for market impact costs, another 
form of transaction costs that disincentivises arbitrage. Third, if equilibrium prices are not located 
symmetrically around the equilibrium price (Norden, 2009), than larger spreads will result in larger 
magnitudes of mispricing. For these reasons, the bid-ask spreads of both shares and futures should be 
positively related to mispricing.  
We test each of these assertions by testing the two following models: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (27) 
   
And 
 𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (28) 
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Where 𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑖 is the relative mispricing of observation 𝑖 – as defined by equation (26) – and  
𝐴𝐵𝑆_𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑖 is the absolute value of relative mispricing. 𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆𝑖 is the time-to-maturity 
measured in months, 𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖 is the futures’ relative bid-ask spread equalling (𝐹𝑡1
𝑎 − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏 )/𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 , and 
𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆 is the share’s relative bid-ask spread equalling (𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 − 𝑆𝑡1
𝑏 )/𝑆𝑡1
𝑚. 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 is a measure of 
which time period an observation occurred within. We arbitrarily create periods as 5 year intervals 
between 1995 and 2015. 
Table X presents OLS estimates for equations (27) and (28) and depicts the relationship 
between futures mispricing and the four explanatory variables. It shows that all three explanatory 
variables are positively related to relative mispricing, and that relative mispricing has been trending 
downwards over the sample period.  
Table X 
Mispricing and Explanatory Variables: Regressions 
 RMP ABS_RMP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0017*** -0.0003*** -0.0001*** 0.0013*** 0.0000*** 0.0004*** 
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
TTM_MONTHS  0.0003*** 0.0003***  0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  [0.0000] [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000] 
F_RBAS  0.0081*** 0.0102***  0.00849*** 0.0122*** 
  [0.0001] [0.0001]  [0.0001] [0.0001] 
S_RBAS  0.2830*** 0.2633***  0.3207*** 0.2861*** 
  [0.0009] [0.0010]  [0.0009] [0.0009] 
PERIOD -0.0003***  -0.0001*** -0.0003***  -0.0001*** 
 [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
Observations 4,454,784 4,454,784 4,454,784 4,454,784 4,454,784 4,454,784 
Adj. R2 0.0138 0.1058 0.1066 0.0080 0.1160 0.1189 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
       
Observing the 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 coefficient in column (1) we can see that relative mispricing has 
fallen an average of 3 bps over each 5 year period. However, once other explanatory variables are 
incorporated in column (3) the 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 coefficient remains significant, but drops to a third of its 
previous value – from -3 bps to -1 bps. A possible explanation is that the downward trend in 
mispricing is a result of growing liquidity in both the futures and equity markets, and these two 
factors are captured by the bid-ask spread variables. 𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆 is highly significant and 
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positive, confirming our hypothesis that mispricing increase with time-to-maturity. Both 𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆 and 
𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆 are significant and negative. 
These results suggest that all four explanatory variables significantly impact the magnitude at 
which a futures contract is mispriced. The first three variables are incorporated in further regressions 
to control for the relative mispricing in observations that is not attributable to the market value of 
dividends and imputation credits. We refer to the controls as ‘Mispricing Controls’ in subsequent 
regressions. 
7.1.2. The market value of cash dividends (delta) 
A key component of later analysis is an estimated market value of cash dividends – which we 
refer to as delta from here on – that can be applied across all firms over the sample period. This is 
necessary for calculating the theta variable for each individual observation when using equation (18), 
and can also be incorporated into later regressions when we value imputation credits.  
We use a subsample of observations containing unfranked dividends to determine an estimate 
of delta. Following CFG (2004), SFG (2013) and Cannavan (2013) we assume that futures contracts 
are, on average, not mispriced and that any residual 𝑅𝑀𝑃 can be attributable to the market value of 
the cash dividend scaled by the share price: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃 =
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 = 𝛿
𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  (29) 
   
This can then be converted to the following regression form: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 (30) 
   
Where 𝛽0 represents the transaction cost differential and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 represents the 
mispricing controls from the previous section: 𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆, 𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆, and 𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆. 
Although we, and other papers within the literature, demonstrate that there is insignificant 
mispricing in futures without an ex-dividend event, there is a caveat when applying this logic to 
observations with dividends. This is that dividends are not known with certainty prior to their 
announcement. While prior literature has shown that, on average, dividends, ex-dividend dates, and 
55 
 
franking percentages are predictable by the market, some of this results can be attributable to the 
stickiness of dividends, and is also conditional on there being a large enough sample ex-dividend 
events for counter-examples to be averaged away.  
This is not an issue when looking at franked dividends due to the abundance of ex-dividend 
events. Our unfranked dividend subsample, however, is dominated by futures securities which show 
significant variation in mispricing. Untabulated results show these securities are associated with only 
a few ex-dividend events, and when looked at more closely, the large amounts of mispricing disappear 
once the dividends in question were announced. This suggests that large, unexpected changes in 
dividends are less predictable by the market and may lead to significant mispricing.  
To control for this possibility we stratify our unfranked subsample into three separate groups. 
The first group (Unrestricted) has no restrictions and includes all observations with an associated 
unfranked dividend. The second group restricts the subsample by excluding observations in which 
dividends have increased more than 60%, or decreased more than 10% from the previous year. The 
third group excludes observations in which dividends have increased more than 20% or decreased 
more than 5% from the previous year. We run the regression model in equation (30) on these three 
groups while alternating the inclusion of both an intercept term and the mispricing controls created in 
the prior section. 
In Table IX we present the OLS estimates of the market value of cash dividends. It shows that 
excluding an intercept term significantly affects the estimates of delta, and markedly improves the 
model’s fit as measured by the adjusted R2. The twelve estimates of delta are all highly significant and 
range from 0.8474 to 0.9725. 
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Table XI 
Valuing Cash Dividends: Regressions 
 Unrestricted -10% < ∆ Div. < 60% -5% < ∆ Div. < 20% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Intercept Included (FY96 – FY14) 
Intercept -0.0013*** 0.0007*** -0.0005*** 0.00046*** 0.0014*** 0.0006*** 
 [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0001] 
Cash Dividend 0.9725*** 0.9253*** 0.9279*** 0.8870*** 0.8684*** 0.8474*** 
 [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0020] [0.0019] 
Mispricing Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 94,010 94,010 60,685 60,685 37,943 37,943 
Adj. R2 0.7493 0.7627 0.7440 0.7656 0.8317 0.8621 
Panel B: Intercept Excluded (FY96 – FY14) 
Intercept       
       
Cash Dividend 0.9122*** 0.9316*** 0.9017*** 0.9033*** 0.9301*** 0.8681*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0011] [0.0007] [0.0012] [0.0006] [0.0010] 
Mispricing Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 94,010 94,010 60,685 60,685 37,943 37,943 
Adj. R2 0.9583 0.9610 0.9661 0.9690 0.9845 0.9876 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
       
 
Panel A includes an intercept term, or a coefficient for the transaction cost differential, while 
Panel B excludes it. From first glance, some of the intercept coefficients don’t make economic 
sense
51
, and the adjusted R
2
s are considerably higher in the models excluding an intercept term. For 
these reasons we focus on the results in Panel B. This narrows the range of delta estimates to 0.8681 - 
0.9316. 
The first two columns contain the unrestricted subsample, while the other four exclude 
observations with large, unexpected changes in dividends. The second dividend restriction – displayed 
in columns (5) and (6) – reduces the number of observations significantly, but does little to improve 
the fit of the model – as measured by adjusted R2. We therefore exclude the results from columns (5) 
and (6) using this restriction, and conclude that the most accurate estimates are produced by the 
remaining models that include mispricing controls – columns (2) and (4). These model’s delta 
coefficients provide us with our estimates of the market value of cash dividends: 0.9033 and 0.9316. 
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57 
 
These estimates can be interpreted as saying that a dollar of cash dividends has a market value of 
either $0.90 or $0.93.  
7.1.3. The market value of imputation credits (theta) 
Similar to the prior section, we value delta and theta by assuming that any relative mispricing 
(RMP) is attributable to the market values of the cash dividends and imputation credits:  
 𝑅𝑀𝑃1 =
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 = δ
𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 + 𝜙
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  (31) 
   
By observing a large variability in franking percentages of ex-dividend events regression 
results can accurately estimate the market value of both components of the dividend simultaneously.
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But analysing the value of theta on a per-firm, per-security or per-year basis using this method is 
usually not possible. These types of subsamples often lack the number of observations
53
 and 
variability in franking percentages needed for the accurate estimates of both dividend components. 
However, if we assume that cash dividends are valued at a fixed percentage across firms and over 
moderate time periods, we can substitute in our two estimates of delta from the previous section as 
follows:  
 𝑅𝑀𝑃2 =
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4 − 0.9033 ∗ 𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 = 𝜙
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  (32) 
   
And, 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃3 =
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4 − 0.9317 ∗ 𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 = 𝜙
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  (33) 
   
Using this method allows us to estimate the value of theta in smaller subsamples without 
encountering misestimation issues. We also include these relationships in our main analysis of valuing 
theta. All three relationships represented by equations: (31), (32) and (33) can be converted to the 
following regressions forms: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 (34) 
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 In most cases this is only a problem when using transaction prices rather than bid-ask quotes. 
58 
 
And, 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 (35) 
   
And,  
 𝑅𝑀𝑃3 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 (36) 
   
We use these three models to value imputation credits for the period 1 July 2001 to June 30 
2014. This is the longest period of time in which no regulatory changes have occurred that would 
adversely impact the value of theta. Our sample over this time period consists of 2.3 million 
observations, and is tested both with and without mispricing controls and an intercept coefficient. 
In Table XII we present the results for these three models. Across the twelve separate 
regressions, estimates of theta range from 0.0533 to 0.2464, however the regressions using a floating 
value for cash dividends (𝑅𝑀𝑃1) provide the most consistent and stable results, with estimates 
staying between the range of 0.0702 and 0.0774. These models also have the most explanatory power 
in terms of adjusted R
2
s. Mispricing controls marginally improve the model’s explanatory power, and 
the inclusion of an intercept has little to no effect on the floating model’s estimates of theta, with the 
changes being mainly reflected in the value of delta and mispricing coefficients.  
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Table XII 
Valuing Imputation Credits: Regressions 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃1 𝑅𝑀𝑃2 𝑅𝑀𝑃3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: FY01 – FY14 – Intercept Included 
Intercept 0.0012*** 0.0010*** 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0010*** 
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Cash Dividend 0.9209*** 0.9231***     
 [0.0003] [0.0003]     
Imputation Credit 0.0774*** 0.0702*** 0.1121*** 0.1091*** 0.0562*** 0.0533*** 
 [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Mispricing Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 
Adj. R2 0.9483 0.9489 0.0503 0.0617 0.0132 0.0254 
Panel B: FY01 – FY14 – Intercept Excluded 
Intercept       
       
Cash Dividend 0.9763*** 0.9451***     
 [0.0003] [0.0003]     
Imputation Credit 0.0718*** 0.0736*** 0.2464*** 0.1626*** 0.1784*** 0.1021*** 
 [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0003] 
Mispricing Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 
Adj. R2 0.9945 0.9947 0.6418 0.6645 0.4881 0.5165 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
       
Panel A presents the results including an intercept term, with even numbered columns 
including mispricing controls. The removal of the intercept coefficient significantly increases the 
adjusted R
2
 for all three dependant variables, but only impacts the theta estimates in the models using 
a fixed value of cash dividends. The models using a fixed value of cash dividends – columns (3) to (6) 
– show significant variation in theta estimates when an intercept term is omitted. The variation can be 
attributable to the inclusion of mispricing controls, which have a large impact on estimates. This 
suggests that these estimates of cash dividends do not provide the best line of fit for the data, and the 
resultant ‘mispricing’ is partly being captured in the mispricing controls. 
For these reasons we conclude that the four models including a floating value of for cash 
dividends provide the most accurate estimates of theta. There is little variation between each of their 
estimates, but the model excluding an intercept term and incorporating mispricing controls (Panel B – 
column (2)) has the most explanatory power in terms of adjusted R
2
, and we conclude that it provides 
the most accurate joint estimate of delta and theta. Its estimates can be interpreted as saying that the 
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market value of a dollar of cash dividends equals $0.9451, while the market value of a dollar of 
imputation credits equal $0.0736, which is considerably less than its face value.  
Based on these findings we conclude that the average value of theta priced into all futures 
transactions is a small and positive number. This evidence therefore supports hypothesis 1.1. 
These estimates can be compared to those of Cannavan (2013) who over a shorter period
54
 
finds that cash dividends and imputation credits are valued at 93.34% and 16.77% of their face values 
respectively; and SFG (2013) who over a similar period
55
 finds that cash dividends and imputation 
credits are valued at 93.82% and 12.43% of their face value
56
.  
This raises the question: why is our estimate of theta considerably lower than these 
comparable studies? Some variation in theta estimates can be attributable to differing values of delta, 
however our estimate of delta is extremely similar to theirs, and actually smaller in the case of SFG 
(2013) who use a more comparable sample period. A possible reason is due to differences in sample 
construction. One considerable difference between this study and those in the prior literature, is that 
we have kept all observations with a time-to-maturity of less than 1 year. This is in contrast to CFG, 
Cannavan (2013) and SFG (2013) who only include observations occurring in the contract nearest to 
maturity. If most futures trade on a quarterly maturity cycle, this gives the time-to-maturity of their 
sample an upper bound of 3 months (90 days). While not all futures trade on this cycle, the vast 
majority do, and having this upper bound would markedly reduce the average time-to-maturity of 
their observations. This may have a considerable impact on results if the value of theta varies across 
time-to-maturities, or is significantly impacted by dividend-capturing activity in the weeks leading up 
to an ex-dividend event. 
To test whether this is the case, we first look at how the value of theta for a single futures 
contract changes across time-to-maturities. To do this we use our earlier delta estimate of 0.9317 to 
produce theta estimates for all observations:  
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 July 2001 to Dec 2008. 
55
 July 2001 to Mar 2013 
56
 It should be noted that the results of SFG (2013) included an intercept term of 0.0006, which may have a 
marginal effect on the comparability of their results. However, even if we compare them with our results from 
Panel A – which estimate delta to equal 0.9231 and theta to equal 0.0702 – our estimate of theta remains 
significantly smaller.  
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 𝜙 =
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚𝑒𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑚 − 𝑋𝑡4 − 0.9317 ∗ 𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
 (37) 
   
We then round up each observation’s TTM_DAYS to a multiple of 5, before creating 
averages of theta for each security, at each TTM_DAYS increment. We select a Commonwealth Bank 
LEPO contract (CBAS18.AX) as an example, due to it being extremely liquid and generating 6,461 
observations over the months prior to its ex-dividend date. The average values of theta across time-to-
maturities are plotted on a line graph and displayed in Figure IIIError! Reference source not found..  
 
Figure III: Average values of theta across time-to-maturities for the futures contract CBAS18.AX. The vertical axis 
represents percentage values of theta, while the horizontal axis displays the number of days between the date of observation 
and maturity of the contract, rounded up to the nearest multiple of 5. This subsample consists of 6,461 observations between 
16/05/2013 and 16/08/2013, that are assoicated with an ex-dividend date of 19/08/2013 (when TTM = 12 days). 
 
Figure III shows that the average level of theta varies considerably over the period that the 
futures contract traded. The value of theta stays considerably low (0% - 5%) from 𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 105 to 
75
57
, before experiencing a dramatic upwards trend between days 75 and 50. The most obvious 
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 These values of theta are based on the delta estimate of 0.9317 used. If the true delta values differ between 
companies then this estimate may not be correct, and therefore the theta estimates may be higher or lower than 
those displayed in the graph. However, if the value of delta remains relatively constant for individual firms over 
short period – a fair assumption – then this exercise is still useful, and accurate, in measuring the changes in 
theta over time-to-maturities. 
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explanation for this is that large institutions that must abide by the 45-day rule are entering into trades 
to capture dividends and make arbitrage profits, thus bidding up the value of theta
58
. After this, there 
is a slight downward trend in theta, before again spiking upwards in the final 10 days before ex-
dividend. Similarly, this is most likely caused by small domestic investors, who do not have to abide 
by the 45-day rule, entering into arbitrage trades just before the ex-dividend date and bidding up the 
value of theta. 
This graph displays that theta appears to be more affected by dividend-capturing activity in 
the weeks preceding the ex-dividend date, rather than the value placed on imputation credits by long-
term equity providers and the long-term marginal investor. There is an important distinction that 
needs to be made between the value that dividend-capturers place on imputation credits, and the value 
place on them by the long-term marginal investor. While both investors may influence the market 
value of theta at different points in time, it is the latter type of investor that determines the cost of 
capital faced by firms, and it is their value of theta that is the most consequential, and of the most 
interest to us.  
If this example is reflective of the greater population, than this finding has the obvious 
implication that prior studies that provide a heavier weighting to observations with lower time-to-
maturities are upwardly biasing their estimates of theta, and their estimates are more accurately 
reflecting the level of dividend capturing activity occurring within the market rather than the value 
placed on theta by long-term equity providers. Obviously, this is only one example, using one 
security, and we perform further testing to ensure this is the case.  
To do this we incorporate an interaction variable that measures the interaction between the 
value of imputation credits and time-to-maturity: 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝐼𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌𝑖) + 𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 (38) 
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 While the 45-day rule prevents institutions from entering into fully hedged arbitrage positions by requiring 
them to maintain at least 30% exposure on their positions, there are still managed funds dedicated to targeting 
large, fully franked dividends, and partially hedging their positions using futures contracts. For example, the 
Aurora Dividend Income Trust specifically targets shares paying large franked dividends, purchasing them ~45 
days before ex-dividend, and hedging their positions by 50% (previously 70%) usually using futures contracts. 
This activity, while not considered ‘arbitrage’ in the strictest sense, still represent large purchases of futures 
contracts, and has the ability to increase the value of imputation credits priced in dramatically.  
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  Where 𝐶𝐷𝑖 is the time 𝑡4 face value of the cash dividend scaled by the share’s mid-quote
59
, 
𝐼𝐶𝑖 is the time 𝑡4 face value of the imputation credit scaled by the share’s mid-quote
60
, and 
𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌𝑖 is the time-to-maturity in months. 
The regression results for this model are presented in Table XIII, Panel A. It shows that the 
interaction variable is highly significant and negative, and demonstrates that the value of theta 
increases markedly as a futures contract nears maturity.   
Column (1) estimates that delta equals 0.9230, theta equals 0.1049, and that increasing a 
contracts time-to-maturity by one month reduces the value of theta by -0.0087. Columns (2) and (3) 
provide similar estimates of theta and the interaction term. As seen in the latter three columns the 
exclusion of an intercept term significantly increases the estimate of theta to 0.1653, but also increases 
the economic significance of the interaction term, with the coefficient decreasing to -0.237. We can 
interpret this as saying that theta increases by 2.37% each month a contract gets closer to maturity.  
This provides evidence that the value of theta increases significantly as a contract nears an ex-
dividend date, and in turn time-to-maturity, and suggests that prior studies may have upwardly biased 
their estimates of theta by limiting their samples to futures nearest to maturity. The evidence therefore 
supports hypothesis 1.2. 
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 𝐶𝐷𝑖 =
𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  
60
 𝐼𝐶𝑖 =
𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑚  
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Table XIII 
Valuing Imputation Credits: Regressions 
 Intercept Included Intercept Excluded 
 𝑅𝑀𝑃1 𝑅𝑀𝑃2 𝑅𝑀𝑃3 𝑅𝑀𝑃1 𝑅𝑀𝑃2 𝑅𝑀𝑃3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Full Sample with TTM and IC Interaction 
Intercept 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0007***    
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]    
Cash Dividend 0.9230***   0.9274***   
 [0.0003]   [0.0003]   
Imputation Credit 0.1049*** 0.1440*** 0.0876*** 0.1653*** 0.2206*** 0.1554*** 
 [0.0011] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
IC * TTM_MONTHS -0.0087*** -0.0088*** -0.0087*** -0.0237*** -0.0254*** -0.0233*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001] 
TTM_MONTHS 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Mispricing Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 2,292,298 
Adj. R2 0.9490 0.0625 0.0263 0.9948 0.6733 0.5273 
Panel B: TTM less than 1 month 
Intercept 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 0.0016***    
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]    
Cash Dividend 0.8665***   0.8979***   
 [0.0017]   [0.0017]   
Imputation Credit 0.1674*** 0.0909*** 0.0318*** 0.1677*** 0.1560*** 0.0939*** 
 [0.0038] [0.0013] [0.0000] [0.0040] [0.0011] [0.0010] 
Mispricing Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 78,810 78,810 78,810 78,810 78,810 78,810 
Adj. R2 0.9723 0.0736 0.0311 0.9961 0.6915 0.5264 
Panel C: TTM greater than 6 months 
Intercept 0.0000*** 0.0001*** -0.0001***    
 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]    
Cash Dividend 0.9243***   0.9238***   
 [0.0017]   [0.0016]   
Imputation Credit 0.0066 0.0503*** -0.0089*** 0.0070 0.0512*** -0.0100*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0037] [0.0011] [0.0011] 
Mispricing Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202,247 202,247 202,247 202,247 202,247 202,247 
Adj. R2 0.9331 0.0419 0.0381 0.9943 0.7162 0.6066 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
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While we don’t have direct evidence for the cause of this relationship, the most intuitive 
explanation is that it is due to dividend capturers bidding up the price of theta towards the ex-dividend 
date. To differentiate between the values determined by dividend-capturers and long-term equity 
providers we stratify the sample into observations with a time-to-maturity of less than one month 
(78,810 observations), and those with a time-to-maturity of more than six months (202,247 
observations). As we will show in Section 0, the profitability of dividend capturing using arbitrage is 
negatively related to time-to-maturity, and increases exponentially in the weeks preceding the ex-
dividend event
61
. For these reasons we expect dividend capturers to be most active, and their effects 
on theta to be the most pronounced, in the month preceding maturity
62
.  
Panel B displays the results for time-to-maturities less than one month. The first noticeable 
aspect of these results is that the intercept term has much larger coefficients than in the original 
analysis (~17 bps versus ~7 bps in Panel B). This is consistent with the theory that dividend-capturers 
and arbitrageurs face, and are more likely to account for, larger transaction cost differentials relative 
to long-term investors. Columns (1) and (4) both estimate theta to equal approximately 16.7%, which 
is much higher than our original analysis, and is also more comparable to the findings of Cannavan 
(2013) and SFG (2013).  
Panel C displays the results for time-to-maturities greater than six months. In contrast to Panel 
B, the intercept term in the first three regressions is economically indifferent from zero. This is also 
consistent with the theory that long-term providers of equity are unlikely to account for transaction 
costs. Most notably, both regressions in columns (1) and (4) find that the value of imputation credits is 
not significantly different from zero.  
This result suggests that the marginal long-term providers of equity are foreign, and derive no 
value from imputation credits, and supports hypothesis 1.3. Due to it being this type of investor that 
determines the cost of capital for Australian firms, our findings provide evidence that imputation 
credits will have no impact on the cost of equity, and therefore no impact on the share price of 
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 An explanation for this relationship is discussed towards the end of Section 7.2.2, and a mathematical 
reasoning is provided in equation (41). 
62
 The results are the same when restricting time-to-maturities to less than two months, with only the magnitudes 
of coefficients reducing slightly. 
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Australian firms. This finding is in direct contrast to both the dividend drop-off and simultaneous 
pricing literature, which has consistently estimated positive values of theta. Conversely, our results 
are consistent with other are of the literature that found imputation credits have no noticeable impact 
on the cost of equity, and are not capitalised into stock prices (Lajbcygier and Wheatley, 2012; Siua, 
Sault and Warren, 2012; Cannavan, 2013). Our findings therefore provide a conclusion that is 
compatible with both sections of literature, and acts to eliminate the inconsistency that currently 
exists.  
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7.2. Evaluating Profitability of the Trading Strategy 
In this section we provide the methodology used to evaluate the profitability of the dividend 
capturing arbitrage strategy outlined in Section 5.3, and the associated results from our analyses. 
Section 7.2.1 provides a distribution of profitability across the sample period, Section 7.2.2 looks at 
stock and future specific attributes that effect profitability, Section 7.2.3 analyses the effects of 
regulatory changes on profitability, and Section 7.2.4 relaxes the most restrictive assumptions used 
and provides three realistic examples of the strategy in use and the profitability that it yields in these 
cases. 
7.2.1. Distribution of profitability 
We start by looking at the distribution of relative profitability across the entire sample period 
(1 Jan 1996 – 30 June 2014) to get an understanding of the frequency and severity of profitable 
opportunities. To do this we first create a measure of relative profitability for every observation with 
one franked dividend event before maturity. The measure reflects the total profitability that would be 
yielded if an individual used the trading strategy on that observation, scaled by the share’s prevailing 
ask price:    
 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖 =
𝐷𝑡3𝑒
𝑟(𝑡4−𝑡3) + 𝐼𝐶𝑡3𝑒
−𝑟(𝑡5−𝑡4) − (𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 𝑒𝑚(𝑡4−𝑡1) − 𝐹𝑡1
𝑏 − 𝑋𝑡4)
𝑆𝑡1
𝑎  (39) 
   
Where 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖 is the relative profitability of observation 𝑖. This estimate doesn’t adjust for the 
time length of the investment (𝑡4 − 𝑡1), and assumes that the entire investment is funded with debt. 
Because we’re assuming the entire strategy is funded with debt, and no individual capital is required, 
any profits yielded are not discounted, and any positive value of 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖 automatically represents 
abnormal returns
63
. We plot the 𝑅𝐴𝑃s on a frequency distribution in Figure IV to illustrate the 
frequency and magnitude of profitable opportunities. 
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 We relax this assumption in section 7.2.4 and incorporate capital investment. In this situation we measure 
relative profitability as a portion of the invested capital, and subtract the risk-free rate of interest from the final 
RAP to calculate abnormal profits. 
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Figure IV: Frequency distribution of observations by relative profitability (RAP), as measured by equation (39). The 
distribution encompasses the entire sample period – from 1 Jan 1996 to 30 June 2014 – and is composed of over 2.36 million 
observations.  
 
Observing Figure IV we can see that the distribution is negatively skewed, and that while the 
majority of observations are unprofitable, a significant portion of observations present profitable 
opportunities
64
. 25.6% of all observations provide an 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖 greater than zero, with a 95
th
 percentile of 
44 bps and a 99
th
 percentile of 89 bps
65
. This provides some initial evidence that, as hypothesised, 
profitable opportunities exist, and the trading strategy has the potential to earn abnormal profits.  
We then adjust the relative profitability measure to account for the time of investment 
(𝑡4 − 𝑡1) by converting 𝑅𝐴𝑃 to a measure of monthly relative profit:  
 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌𝑖 = 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖 ∗
30
(𝑡4 − 𝑡1)
 (40) 
   
Where 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌𝑖 is the relative monthly profit for observation 𝑖. We then repeat the 
previous analysis by plotting the 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 values on a frequency distribution in Figure V. 
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 It is important to remember that deterministic arbitrage of this type is risk-free, and profits are locked in with 
certainty once the trade is entered into. This means that only a small portion of profitable opportunities have to 
present themselves for investors to be able to take advantage of this strategy and earn abnormal returns.  
65
 As a note, these figures present the distribution of all observations, regardless of their dividend yield, franking 
percentages or time-to-maturities. Once we narrow down our sample to observations that are most likely to be 
profitable, the magnitude of 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖  percentiles increases markedly. 
69 
 
 
Figure V: Frequency distribution of observations by monthly relative profitability (RAP_MONTHLY), as calculated in 
equation (40). The distribution encompasses the entire sample period – from 1 Jan 1996 to 30 June 2014 – and is composed 
of over 2.36 million observations 
 
Observing Figure V we can see that by adjusting by time, relative profitability becomes close 
to normally distributed, and much more tightly dispersed around zero. This suggests that the fat tail 
that is visible in Figure IV is caused by a large number of observations being so unprofitable due to 
being so far out from maturity. Because the adjustment made for time merely scales RAP by a time 
variable, the signs of observations don’t change, and the percentage of profitable observations as 
measured by RAP_MONTHLY remains unchanged at 25.6%. However, the percentile observations 
reduce dramatically, with the 95
th
 percentile observation dropping to 19 bps (from 44 bps), and the 
99
th
 percentile dropping to 68 bps (from 89 bps). 
What these analyses show is that even after accounting for the time length of the investment 
there are still significant profitable opportunities across the entire sample period, with the top 5% of 
observations yielding monthly abnormal profits of 19 bps, or 2.28% annually
66
. Also, it’s notable that 
we achieve this result before narrowing down the sample of observations in any way. Intuitively, once 
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 We are careful not to use compounding returns when converting profits from monthly to annually. This is 
because the 45-day rule limits the amount of imputation credits that can be redeemed using this trading strategy, 
and therefore prevents an investor from continually undertaking the strategy and compounding these returns. 
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we determine characteristics are positively related to profitability, we can narrow our sample down 
based on those attributes, and the distribution will shift to the right. We therefore confirm hypothesis 
2.1. 
To provide some summary statistics of the profitable observations we take a subsample of 
observations with a 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 greater than 50 bps and group them by firm. We also calculate 
the averages of variables of interest for these observations. Variables of interest that have not yet been 
defined are as follows:  𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑖 is the time-to-maturity of observation 𝑖 measured in days; 
𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖 is the dividend yield of observation 𝑖 measured as the dividend per share scaled by the 
share’s prevailing mid-quote at time 𝑡1; 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐸𝐷 is the franking percentage of observations 𝑖’s 
associated dividend; and 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑇𝐴 is a measure of observation 𝑖’s implicit value of theta, as measured 
by using equation (37) and a delta estimate of 0.9317. We present the firms with over 100 
observations and their corresponding results in Table XIV.  
Table XIV 
Profitable Observations by Firm 
This table provides a summary of the observations that yield a monthly relative profit (RAP monthly) greater than 50 bps grouped by firm.  
Firm RAP_MONTHLY RAP TTM_DAYS DIV_YIELD FRANKED THETA Observations 
CBA 0.01340 0.00998 28.5 0.0332 1.0000 0.0648 19,012 
WBC 0.01110 0.00676 21.0 0.0297 1.0000 0.1674 4,812 
WOW 0.01808 0.00400 10.8 0.0173 1.0000 0.1247 4,727 
TLS 0.01142 0.00521 16.7 0.0280 1.0000 0.1568 4,293 
NAB 0.00977 0.00761 26.6 0.0312 0.9770 0.2008 3,265 
ANZ 0.00782 0.00836 34.0 0.0278 0.9973 0.0191 1,382 
QAN 0.02169 0.00328 8.9 0.0281 1.0000 0.0559 886 
BLD 0.00874 0.00324 12.7 0.0229 1.0000 0.0202 747 
AMP 0.00808 0.00206 8.0 0.0198 0.7500 0.0644 498 
WES 0.02406 0.00535 6.7 0.0187 1.0000 0.1960 475 
STO 0.00671 0.00176 8.0 0.0125 1.0000 0.0845 465 
LLC 0.03984 0.00422 6.8 0.0215 1.0000 0.1959 240 
ZFX 0.00951 0.01016 32.3 0.0381 1.0000 0.2701 219 
RIO 0.00605 0.00306 15.9 0.0124 1.0000 0.1075 194 
WPL 0.02447 0.00559 7.5 0.0225 1.0000 0.2544 131 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
        
Expectedly, the firms with futures securities that yield the highest returns have relatively high 
dividend yields and franking percentages. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (ASX:CBA) provides 
the most profitable opportunities, having over 19,000 observations that yield 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌s in 
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excess of 50 bps. They have an average monthly relative profitability of 134 bps, an average dividend 
yield of 3.3% (all of which were fully franked), and an average time-to-maturity of 28.5 days. Other 
notable firms are Westpac Banking Corporation (ASX:WBC), Woolworths Limited (ASX:WOW), 
and Telstra Corporation Limited (ASX:TLS); all of which had over 4,000 observations that yielded 
monthly returns in excess of 50 bps. The average 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌s for this subsample range from 65 
bps for Santos Limited (ASX:STO), to 398 bps for Lend Lease Corporation (ASX:LLC). The higher 
profitability of LLC appears to be attributable to their reasonable dividend yields, and the extremely 
low time-to-maturity of the observations included
67
.   
7.2.2. Comparing Profitability Vigintiles 
In this section we stratify our sample into the financial years that the payment date fell within, 
and then into Vigintiles (groups of 20) based on monthly relative profitability (𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌𝑖). 
We then test for statistical differences in key variables between the two extreme Vigintile groups in 
each financial year. We choose Vigintiles rather than the traditionally used deciles (groups of 10) for 
two reasons. First, the large sample sizes we have for each financial year
68
 allow us to be more 
selective, and narrow down to smaller subsets of the data without sacrificing statistical validity. 
Second, due to the trading strategy utilising arbitrage, investors are able to lock in profits, and 
therefore have much more discretion over which trades they wish to enter into. In addition, the huge 
number of observations that exist, and the fact that only one trade is necessary per year, an investor 
can realistically target the top 5%, or even top 1%, of profitable observations
69
. 
All variables tested for statistical differences between the Vigintiles have already been 
defined, except for 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹 which refers to the interest rate differential, and measures the 
difference between the prevailing margin loan rate and the applicable risk-free rate at the time of 
observation. The results for yearly Vigintile comparisons are displayed in Table XV.   
                                                     
67
 For an average time-to-maturity to be so low it must be the case that the ex-dividend event was either on the 
day of, or the few days preceding, the contract’s maturity. This, in conjunction with a reasonable average 
dividend yield of 2.15% is most likely the driving force behind LLCs exceptionally high average 𝑅𝐴𝑃. 
68
 Each financial year has a minimum of 4,000 observations, and ranges up to 600,000 observations. 
69
 For the sake of robustness we re-ran the following tests using deciles. The results were almost identical, with 
only the magnitude of the differences in variables changing.  
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Table XV 
Comparison of Profitability Vigintiles: By Year 
Financial Year RAP_MONTHLY RAP THETA TTM_DAYS DIV_YIELD FRANKED RATE_DIF F_RBAS S_RBAS Observations 
Expected Relationship + + ? ? + + – – –  
FY 1996 
Vig. 20 0.0021 0.0014 0.0487 30.2961 0.0151 1.0000 0.0299 0.0094 0.0013 206 
Vig. 1 -0.0054 -0.0152 0.5732 99.4854 0.0201 0.7998 0.0302 0.0195 0.0045 206 
Dif. 0.0075*** 0.0166*** -0.5245*** -69.1893*** -0.0050*** 0.2002*** -0.0003*** -0.0101*** -0.0032*** 
 
FY 1997 
Vig. 20 0.0166 0.0147 0.0080 40.8270 0.0383 1.0000 0.0303 0.0099 0.0014 1,590 
Vig. 1 -0.0044 -0.0174 0.6667 137.5723 0.0245 0.6169 0.0306 0.0161 0.0036 1,590 
Dif. 0.0210*** 0.0321*** -0.6587*** -96.7453*** 0.0138*** 0.3831*** -0.0003*** -0.0062*** -0.0022*** 
 
FY 1998 
Vig. 20 0.0073 0.0103 -0.1230 55.3953 0.0294 1.0000 0.0308 0.0093 0.0013 1,361 
Vig. 1 -0.0048 -0.0188 0.8987 129.5724 0.0185 0.7002 0.0305 0.0156 0.0040 1,361 
Dif. 0.0122*** 0.0292*** -1.0217*** -74.1771*** 0.0109*** 0.2998*** 0.0002*** -0.0064*** -0.0027*** 
 
FY 1999 
Vig. 20 0.0058 0.0065 0.0165 43.9929 0.0258 0.9801 0.0297 0.0093 0.0012 282 
Vig. 1 -0.0104 -0.0257 0.3729 91.4610 0.0160 0.8626 0.0296 0.0439 0.0042 282 
Dif. 0.0162*** 0.0322*** -0.3564*** -47.4681*** 0.0098*** 0.1176*** 0.0001 -0.0346*** -0.0030*** 
 
FY 2000 
Vig. 20 0.0072 0.0073 -0.0186 41.8744 0.0254 0.9284 0.0283 0.0079 0.0011 207 
Vig. 1 -0.0146 -0.0103 0.7570 22.2899 0.0103 0.5188 0.0290 0.0190 0.0017 207 
Dif. 0.0217*** 0.0176*** -0.7756*** 19.5845*** 0.0151*** 0.4096*** -0.0007*** -0.0111*** -0.0006*** 
 
FY 2001 
Vig. 20 0.0046 0.0045 0.0036 36.1140 0.0209 1.0000 0.0287 0.0078 0.0011 579 
Vig. 1 -0.0094 -0.0224 0.7520 80.6149 0.0201 0.8144 0.0276 0.0353 0.0026 579 
Dif. 0.0140*** 0.0269*** -0.7484*** -44.5009*** 0.0007** 0.1856*** 0.0011*** -0.0275*** -0.0016*** 
 
FY 2002 
Vig. 20 0.0079 0.0062 -0.0179 31.6193 0.0221 1.0000 0.0257 0.0044 0.0008 197 
Vig. 1 -0.0131 -0.0277 0.5546 111.4924 0.0199 0.7884 0.0265 0.0443 0.0027 197 
Dif. 0.0210*** 0.0339*** -0.5726*** -79.8731*** 0.0022*** 0.2116*** -0.0008*** -0.0399*** -0.0019*** 
 
FY 2003 
Vig. 20 0.0077 0.0049 0.0873 37.9383 0.0226 0.9955 0.0254 0.0046 0.0010 16,759 
Vig. 1 -0.0038 -0.0115 0.8059 104.3026 0.0241 0.3415 0.0260 0.0114 0.0018 16,760 
Dif. 0.0115*** 0.0163*** -0.7186*** -66.3643*** -0.0015*** 0.6540*** -0.0006*** -0.0069*** -0.0008*** 
 
FY 2004 
Vig. 20 0.0052 0.0046 0.1511 43.6085 0.0250 0.9999 0.0254 0.0050 0.0009 30,103 
Vig. 1 -0.0035 -0.0125 0.5354 114.5432 0.0170 0.7975 0.0252 0.0142 0.0027 30,104 
Dif. 0.0087*** 0.0171*** -0.3843*** -70.9347*** 0.0080*** 0.2024*** 0.0002*** -0.0092*** -0.0018*** 
 
Table continued next page… 
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FY 2005 
Vig. 20 0.0031 0.0063 0.0349 69.5032 0.0278 1.0000 0.0243 0.0039 0.0007 24,356 
Vig. 1 -0.0032 -0.0116 0.6606 117.4713 0.0109 0.8444 0.0240 0.0095 0.0019 24,354 
Dif. 0.0064*** 0.0178*** -0.6257*** -47.9681*** 0.0170*** 0.1556*** 0.0003*** -0.0056*** -0.0012*** 
 
FY 2006 
Vig. 20 0.0032 0.0061 -0.0419 88.0869 0.0290 0.9683 0.0239 0.0045 0.0008 20,733 
Vig. 1 -0.0029 -0.0127 0.7337 138.8694 0.0170 0.4968 0.0237 0.0100 0.0018 20,731 
Dif. 0.0060*** 0.0188*** -0.7756*** -50.7825*** 0.0119*** 0.4715*** 0.0003*** -0.0055*** -0.0010*** 
 
FY 2007 
Vig. 20 0.0008 0.0020 0.2264 78.0522 0.0242 0.9626 0.0237 0.0042 0.0006 6,683 
Vig. 1 -0.0022 -0.0072 0.7236 101.0676 0.0097 0.9929 0.0238 0.0042 0.0005 6,684 
Dif. 0.0030*** 0.0092*** -0.4972*** -23.0154*** 0.0145*** -0.0302*** -0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 
 
FY 2008 
Vig. 20 0.0006 0.0010 0.2503 85.9666 0.0231 0.9779 0.0235 0.0033 0.0005 6,459 
Vig. 1 -0.0023 -0.0141 1.1810 194.4171 0.0082 0.9991 0.0215 0.0043 0.0005 6,461 
Dif. 0.0029*** 0.0150*** -0.9307*** -108.4506*** 0.0149*** -0.0212*** 0.0020*** -0.0010*** 0.0000 
 
FY 2009 
Vig. 20 0.0242 0.0093 0.1259 11.7291 0.0305 1.0000 0.0474 0.0050 0.0006 1,351 
Vig. 1 -0.0110 -0.0165 1.0848 45.0326 0.0171 1.0000 0.0480 0.0220 0.0010 1,351 
Dif. 0.0353*** 0.0258*** -0.9589*** -33.3035*** 0.0135*** 0.0000 -0.0006*** -0.0170*** -0.0004*** 
 
FY 2010 
Vig. 20 0.0208 0.0073 0.1745 11.5985 0.0268 1.0000 0.0471 0.0043 0.0010 1,071 
Vig. 1 -0.0082 -0.0063 1.0560 23.3305 0.0118 0.6949 0.0460 0.0076 0.0006 1,071 
Dif. 0.0290*** 0.0136*** -0.8815*** -11.7320*** 0.0150*** 0.3051*** 0.0011*** -0.0034*** 0.0004*** 
 
FY 2011 
Vig. 20 0.0181 0.0094 0.1672 18.4930 0.0317 1.0000 0.0448 0.0026 0.0007 213 
Vig. 1 -0.0081 -0.0057 0.3858 21.4272 0.0125 0.9885 0.0447 0.0140 0.0004 213 
Dif. 0.0261*** 0.0151*** -0.2186*** -2.9343*** 0.0192*** 0.0115** 0.0001*** -0.0115*** 0.0003*** 
 
FY 2012 
Vig. 20 0.0096 0.0058 0.1549 18.4529 0.0293 1.0000 0.0453 0.0077 0.0006 2,528 
Vig. 1 -0.0119 -0.0185 0.0500 46.7496 0.0154 0.9997 0.0455 0.0395 0.0005 2,528 
Dif. 0.0215*** 0.0243*** 0.1049*** -28.2967*** 0.0139*** 0.0003 -0.0002*** -0.0318*** 0.0001*** 
 
FY 2013 
Vig. 20 0.0199 0.0088 0.1741 14.4916 0.0306 1.0000 0.0497 0.0035 0.0003 1,497 
Vig. 1 -0.0143 -0.0190 0.1666 42.1396 0.0174 0.9775 0.0487 0.0412 0.0005 1,497 
Dif. 0.0342*** 0.0278*** 0.0076 -27.6480*** 0.0132*** 0.0225*** 0.0010*** -0.0377*** -0.0002*** 
 
FY 2014 
Vig. 20 0.0136 0.0077 0.1475 18.5330 0.0266 1.0000 0.0512 0.0020 0.0002 2,075 
Vig. 1 -0.0161 -0.0224 0.1240 47.6426 0.0231 0.9082 0.0499 0.0522 0.0008 2,076 
Dif. 0.0297*** 0.0301*** 0.0235*** -29.1096*** 0.0035*** 0.0918*** 0.0013*** -0.0502*** -0.0006*** 
 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
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For each financial year ‘Vig. 20’ represents the top Vigintile of profitable observations, ‘Vig. 
1’ represents the bottom Vigintile of profitable observations, and ‘Dif.’ represents the difference in 
means between the two extreme Vigintiles. The average 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 of the top Vigintiles ranges 
from 6 bps in FY 2008, to 242 bps in FY 2009. These extreme values however may be a result of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the bull market preceding it
70
. If we exclude financial years 2007 
to 2010 the range of profitability narrows to between 21 bps in FY 1996 and 199 bps in FY 2013. 
There don’t appear to be any obvious long-term trends in profitability, other than the large changes in 
the years surrounding the GFC, and in the financial years of regulatory change. Unexpectedly, 
average 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 in the top Vigintile drops from 166 bps to 73 bps after the introduction of 
the 45-day rule in FY 1998. However, consistent with our hypothesis, profitability drops from 72 bps 
to 46 bps after unused imputation credits were allowed to be redeemed
71
.   
The vast majority of variables have a difference in means that is significant at the 99
th
 
percentile, and that are of the hypothesised direction. These relationships also tend to hold across 
financial years. As expected, dividend yields and franking percentages were consistently higher in the 
top Vigintiles, and observations were more profitable when the difference between the margin lending 
rate and the risk-free rate was minimised. For almost all years, profitability is higher for observations 
with low bid-ask spreads for both futures and shares, reflecting the negative relationship between 
implicit transaction costs and trading profits. However, in later years (FY 2010 onwards) share bid-
ask spreads are higher in profitable Vigintiles. We provide an explanation for this when discussing the 
results for Table XVII and justify why we believe this relationship to be a matter of correlation rather 
than causation. 
After our findings in Section 7.1.3, which suggested dividend-capturing activity bids up the 
value of theta as a futures contract nears maturity, it is uncertain whether profitability will decrease 
with time-to-maturity, or have any relationship at all. If an investor trades on an observations far from 
                                                     
70
 Hodgson and Barrack (1992) find excessive mispricing in the gold bullion futures market during bubble 
periods – which they attribute to a reduced elasticity of supply of arbitrageurs during bull markets. 
71
 These preliminary results, however, don’t control for confounding factors that may be present over the 
changes to the regulatory environment. Our proper analysis of the impact of regulatory changes is found in 
Section 7.2.3. 
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maturity, the value of theta will on average be lower, however his borrowing costs will be 
exceptionally higher. The reverse would be true for an observation near maturity. Which of these 
factors is more influential in determining profitability is an empirical question. Looking at the 
differences in the 𝑇𝑀𝑀_𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 variable between extreme Vigintiles, we observe that for all financial 
years, Vigintile 20 has a considerably lower average time-to-maturity, suggesting that higher 
borrowing costs are more influential than the variations present in theta. To look at this relationship 
more thoroughly we recreate Figure III, and include a line measuring the average 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 
values for each 5 day time-to-maturity integer. We present the results in Figure VI.  
 
 
Figure VI: Average values of THETA and RAP_MONTHLY across time-to-maturities for the futures’ contract 
CBAS18.AX. The vertical axis on the left hand side represents the average percentage value of theta for each time-to-
maturity integer, while the vertical axis on the right hand side represents the average monthly relative profitability for each 
time-to-maturity integer, measured in basis points. The horizontal axis represents the number of days between the date of 
observation and maturity of the contract  
 
Figure VI shows that despite theta increasing dramatically from 65 days onwards, monthly 
profits increases exponentially until the ex-dividend date. The main cause of this is that, as shown in 
equation (40), 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 is an inverse function of time-to-maturity. If we rearrange equation 
(40) to the following:  
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 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌𝑖 = 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖 ∗ 30 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑀
−1 (41) 
   
We can see that, ceteris paribus, as time-to-maturity increases, 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 gets 
exponentially smaller. This relationship is one of the driving forces behind the magnitude of monthly 
relative profitability, and explains why profits increase dramatically regardless of the value of theta 
priced into the contract. 
We repeat our analysis using extreme Vigintiles that were created using the entire sample. 
The results are displayed in Table XVI and show almost identical results to those in the prior table.  
Table XVI 
Comparison of Profitability Vigintiles: Full Sample 
 
Vig. 20 Vig. 1 Expected Dif. Std. Err. p-value 
RAP_MONTHLY 0.0065 -0.0061 + 0.0126*** [0.0000] 0.0007 
RAP 0.0063 -0.0193 + 0.0255*** [0.0000] 0.0004 
THETA 0.0788 0.4363 ? -0.3575*** [0.0013] 0.0012 
TTM_DAYS 47.5 112.0 ? -64.5*** [0.2085] 0.0010 
DIV_YIELD 0.0278 0.0186 + 0.0091*** [0.0000] 0.0010 
FRANKED 0.9962 0.8539 + 0.1423*** [0.0008] 0.0019 
RATE_DIF 0.0318 0.0402 – -0.0084*** [0.0000] 0.0016 
F_RBAS 0.0050 0.0229 – -0.0179*** [0.0000] 0.0008 
S_RBAS 0.0008 0.0012 – -0.0004*** [0.0000] 0.0040 
Observations 118,313 118,313  
 
  
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
       
From Table XVI we can see that, similar to the yearly analysis, the top Vigintile of 
observations have significantly: lower values of theta, shorter time-to-maturities, higher dividend 
yields and franking percentages, lower rate differentials, and lower bid-ask spreads for both the share 
and futures contract. While this doesn’t prove causal relationships between the variables of interest, 
these correlations can be used for two things. First, we can use these variables as criteria to narrow 
down large samples of observations in order to find the most profitable observations; and second, 
these variables can be employed as controls when testing the effect of regulatory changes on 
profitability in the next section.  
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7.2.3. Effect of Regulatory Changes 
In this section we test whether the regulatory changes that occurred on the 1 July 1997 and 1 
July 2000 had a significant impact on the profitability of the trading strategy
72
. We do this by creating 
dummy variables representing the regulatory period an observation belongs to, and incorporating 
other explanatory variables to control for confounding factors which may affect the level of 
profitability. We then regress these variables against relative monthly profitability and relative 
profitability using the following formulas: 
 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3𝑖 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 (42) 
   
And 
 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3𝑖 + 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖 (43) 
   
Where 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to one when an observation’s payment date 
falls within the second regulatory period (FY 1998 to FY 2000). 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3𝑖 is a dummy variable 
equal to one when an observation’s payment date falls within the third regulatory period (FY 2001 to 
FY 2014). 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 represents the six profitability control variables: 𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷, 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐸𝐷, 
𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆, 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹, 𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆, and 𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆, all of which have been defined previously.  
Table XVII displays the OLS regressions estimates for the regressions equations (42) and (43) 
and shows impact of regulatory changes on the profitability of the trading strategy. It shows that all 
control variables, other than 𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆, are of the hypothesised direction and highly significant. 
Dummy variables for 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2 and 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 are significant and negative when regressed against 
monthly profitability, suggesting that both regulatory changes reduced profitability of the trading 
strategy.  Our analysis focuses from the 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 results. Coefficients for the 𝑅𝐴𝑃 models 
have the same sign and significance as those for 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 models unless otherwise noted. 
  
                                                     
72
 The 45-day rule was introduced on 1 July 1997, and superannuation funds were granted the ability to 
redeemed imputation credits on 1 July 2000 is when superannuation funds were granted the ability to redeem 
imputation credits. 
78 
 
Table XVII 
Relative Profitability: Effect of Regulatory Change 
  RAP_MONTHLY RAP 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  -0.0000*** -0.0091*** -0.0037*** -0.0048*** -0.0181*** -0.0035*** 
  [0.0000] [0.0000 [0.0002] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0002] 
PERIOD2 + -0.0010***  -0.0002*** -0.0025***  0.0001*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
PERIOD3 – -0.0006***  -0.0010*** 0.0007***  -0.0025*** 
  [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
DIV_YIELD +  0.1500*** 0.1500***  0.4781*** 0.4783*** 
   [0.0002] [0.0002]  [0.0002] [0.0002] 
FRANKED +  0.0028*** 0.0028***  0.0084*** 0.0084*** 
   [0.0000] [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000] 
TTM_MONTHS –  -0.0006*** -0.0006***  -0.0024*** -0.0024*** 
   [0.0000] [0.0000]  [0.0000] [0.0000] 
RATE_DIF –  -0.0054*** -0.0057***  -0.2909*** -0.2917*** 
   [0.0003] [0.0003]  [0.0003] [0.0003] 
C_TAX +  0.0205*** 0.0062***  0.0560*** 0.0161*** 
   [0.0002] [0.0006]  [0.0001] [0.0005] 
F_RBAS –  -0.2022*** -0.2019***  -0.4869*** -0.4864*** 
   [0.0003] [0.0003]  [0.0003] [0.0003] 
S_RBAS –  0.1193*** 0.1185***  -0.4436*** -0.4554*** 
   [0.0022] [0.0022]  [0.0018] [0.0018] 
Observations  2,365,273 2,365,273 2,365,273 2,365,273 2,365,273 2,365,273 
Adj. R2  0.0008 0.3420 0.3422 0.0038 0.8970 0.8972 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
        
 
Looking at the relationship between profitability and the control variables chosen in column 
(2) and (5) first we can see that all of the coefficients are highly significant and of the hypothesised 
direction. The only counter-example to this is the positive relationship between 𝑆_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆 
and 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌. A positive relationship is counter-intuitive, but is consistent with Ainsworth 
(2011) who finds that bid-ask spreads increase substantially around the ex-dividend date. As 
𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 increases exponentially as observations get closer to maturity (and the ex-dividend 
date), it is likely this would lead to a positive correlation between share spreads and profitability, but 
not a causal relationship. As can be seen in column (5), once we remove the exponential effect of 
time-to-maturity on the dependant variable, the relationship reverses and is significant – consistent 
with our hypothesis.  
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𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷 and 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐸𝐷 are positive and highly significant, with a one percent increase 
in dividend yield and a 10% increase in the franking percentage increasing monthly profitability by 15 
bps and 2.8 bps respectively. 𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆 remains negatively related to profitability in this 
analysis. It also remains significant when regressed against 𝑅𝐴𝑃, suggesting that the relationship 
holds even when excluding the exponential effect present in monthly profitability. The remaining 
control variables – 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝐹, 𝐶_𝑇𝐴𝑋, and 𝐹_𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑆 – are all highly significant and of the 
hypothesised sign. 
The results surrounding the regulatory changes are less clear cut. Column (1) shows that 
relative profitability reduced significantly after both the introduction of the 45-day rule and the 
allowance of unused imputation credits to be redeemed. However, once we control for other variables 
that effect profitability, the magnitude of the 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2 coefficient remains negative but reduces to a 
fifth of its original value. This result is the opposite of our hypothesis; however, a coefficient of 
negative 2 bps is economically insignificant, and may even be caused by the non-linearity in the 
𝑇𝑇𝑀_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝑆 variable not being reflected in the model. This explanation appears to hold up when 
we look at column (6) which shows that once the exponential component of this variable is removed, 
the 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2 coefficient becomes positive and remains statistically, but not economically, 
significant. Based on these results we conclude that the introduction of the 45-day rule had no 
economically significant impact on the average profitability of the trading strategy. We therefore 
reject hypothesis 2.3.1. 
Conversely, when we include control variables in column (4) the negative coefficient for 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3 increases in magnitude to -10 bps and remains highly statistically significant. This result is 
even larger when we measure it against 𝑅𝐴𝑃, finding that the second regulatory change reduced 
profitability by an average of 25 bps. Unlike the first regulatory change, we conclude that the 
allowance of unused imputation credits to be redeemed significantly reduced the average profitability 
of the trading strategy. This finding provides evidence in support of hypothesis 2.3.2. 
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7.2.4. Realistic Examples 
In this section we relax some of the more restrictive assumptions and provide three realistic 
examples of the trading strategy being used using a Commsec Margin Lending account within the 
financial year 2013.  
In our previous analysis we assume our representative investor has unlimited borrowing 
capacity, and is able to fund the trading strategies capital requirements entirely with debt. These 
assumptions don’t hold in reality, with most margin lending providers having capital requirements, 
and limiting the level of leverage that can be taken. Commsec, for instance, assigns a maximum Loan-
to-Value ratio (LVR) to different shares; providing the highest ratios to large, liquid stocks. As ISF’s 
and LEPOs are almost exclusively traded on shares of this nature, almost all of the firms in our 
sample, and all of those used in our examples, have an assigned maximum LVR of 70% - the highest 
LVR offered by Commsec. We conduct the examples on the premise that an investor would maximise 
leverage (70% LVR) in order to minimise capital requirements.  
We also excluded explicit transaction costs from our original analysis. Commsec charges 
brokerage fees of 35 bps for LEPO positions entered into, and 12 bps for equity purchases. They also 
charge an exercise fee of $0.05 per LEPO contract to settle the contract at maturity and close out the 
position
73
. We incorporate all three of these costs into our analysis. For our applicable margin lending 
rate we use Commsec’s current 3 month fixed margin rate of 7.89% (per annum) paid in arrears. We 
then convert this to a continuously compounding rate of 7.59% (per annum). One benefit of an 
investor utilising their own capital, is that it is discounted at a much lower rate relative to the margin 
lending rate. Margin trading is usually seen as a risky, highly leveraged activity. As such, lenders 
charge high fixed interest rates, regardless of the specific margin lending activity being undertaken, or 
its associated level of risk. Because the trading strategy in question is a form of deterministic 
arbitrage, profits are locked in once the trade is entered into, and the investor incurs virtually zero 
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 The trading strategy dictates that the LEPO contracts are held until maturity, at which point they settled 
through physical delivery. This means brokerage fees are only incurred when the two securities are initially 
purchased, and only exercise fees are incurred to close out the positions. 
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risk. This allows us to therefore discount any net earnings at the appropriate risk-free rate rather than 
the significantly higher margin lending rate.  
Margin calls are a costly risk associated with margin lending. However, our strategy involves 
taking a simultaneous long position (purchasing the shares) and short position (selling the futures 
contract) using the same margin lending account. As a result, any fall in the value of shares will be 
offset by rises in the value of the futures (and vice versa), thus perfectly hedging the position and 
negating any chance of a margin call. 
Based on these facts we now choose three persistent trading opportunities of varying 
𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 within the financial year ending 30 June 2014 (FY14). To isolate these 
opportunities we first restrict our sample to observations with a payment date that falls within FY14, a 
dividend yield greater than 2%, and a franking percentage in excess of 80%. This provided a sample 
of 31,454 observations, which we then take the 99
th
, 95
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles of 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 as 
our three examples of varying profitability. These equal to 177.6 bps, 102.9 bps, and 67.3 bps 
respectively. We then find securities that have similar 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 over a large number of 
observations on a single day. We do this to ensure that the profitable opportunities observed are 
persistent and easily actionable, rather than the result of sporadic and unpredictable events of 
mispricing within the market.  
The selected securities and their dates of interest (𝑡1) are displayed in Table XVIII – Panel A. 
Each selected security has at least 99 observations occurring on 𝑡1. We take an average of the 
prevailing share ask price (𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 ) and futures bid price (𝐹𝑡1
𝑏 ) across the 99+ observations occurring on 
the day of 𝑡1, and use these averages as our model inputs. This provides us with our three final 
example opportunities: (1) 99
th
 percentile: CBAS18.AX on 15/08/2013, with an average share ask 
price of $73.73, an average futures bid price of $71.70, and an average 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 of 173.8 bps. 
(2) 95
th
 percentile: CBAZM7.AX on 05/02/2014, with an average share ask price of $72.71, an 
average futures bid price of $70.97, and an average 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 of 101.4 bps. (3) 90th percentile: 
NABG97.AX on 29/04/2013, with an average share ask price of $33.06, an average futures bid price 
of $32.17, and an average 𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌 of 63.6 bps. As can be seen, each of the average 
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𝑅𝐴𝑃_𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻𝐿𝑌s occurring on 𝑡1 are within 5 bps of the percentiles chosen from the frequency 
distribution
74
. The associated dividends, applicable interest rates and transaction costs, and the other 
dates of interest for the examples are displayed in Table XVIII – Panel B.  
Table XVIII 
Examples of Profitable Opportunities 
 Example 1 (99th pctl.) Example 2 (95th pctl.) Example 3 (90th pctl.) 
Panel A: Observation details 
Firm CBA.AX CBA.AX NAB.AX 
LEPO contract CBAS18.AX CBAZM7.AX NABG97.AX 
Date 15/08/2013 05/02/2014 29/04/2013 
# Obs. on Date 204 254 99 
Time-to-maturity 14 days 22 days 31 days 
Avg. THETA 0.170 0.146 0.165 
Avg. RAP_MONTHLY 173.8 bps 101.4 bps 63.6 bps 
Panel B: Model Inputs 
Avg. 𝑆𝑎 $73.73 $72.71 $33.06 
Avg. 𝐹𝑏 $71.70 $70.97 $32.17 
Dividend per share $2.00 $1.83 $0.93 
% Franked 100% 100% 100% 
Imputation Credit $0.86 $0.78 $0.40 
Margin rate 7.59% 7.59% 7.59% 
Risk-free rate 2.50% 2.61% 3.03% 
Brokerage – Shares 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 
Brokerage – LEPOs 0.35% 0.35% 0.35% 
Exercise Costs (per contract) $0.05 $0.05 $0.05 
𝑡1 – Observation date 15/08/2013 05/02/2014 29/04/2013 
𝑡2 – Ex-dividend date 19/08/2013 17/02/2014 30/05/2013 
𝑡3 – Payment date 03/10/2013 03/04/2014 16/07/2013 
𝑡4 – Expiration date 29/08/2013 27/02/2014 30/05/2013 
𝑡5 – End of Financial Year 30/06/2014 30/06/2014 30-06-2014 
Panel C: Investment Required 
# Shares needed 5,800 6,300 12,500 
Total investment $429,618 $460,188 $415,153 
Applicable LVR 70% 70% 70% 
Borrowing Capacity $300,732 $322,131 $290,607 
Invested Capital $128,885 $138,056 $124,546 
Panel D: Results 
Profit in time 𝑡4 dollars $1,828.97 $1,846.61 $1,426.76 
Profit % of investment) 1.42% 1.34% 1.15% 
Time-to-maturity  14 days 22 days 31 days 
Profit % (monthly) 3.04% 1.82% 1.11% 
Abnormal Monthly Returns 2.83% 1.61% 0.86% 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively  
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 99
th
 pctl: 173.8 bps (actual) vs 177.6 bps (selected); 95
th
 pctl: 101.4 bps (actual) vs 102.9 bps (selected); 90
th
 
pctl: 63.6 bps (actual) vs 67.3 bps (selected). 
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We determine the size of investment necessary in each example by assuming that the 
representative investor wants to maximise his profits using one single trade. He would do this by 
receiving the largest amount of imputation credits possible while remaining under the $5,000 ‘small 
shareholder’ threshold. To find the number of shares, and level of investment that satisfies this 
criteria, we divide the $5,000 threshold by the imputation credit per share for each example, before 
rounding the result down to the nearest multiple of 100
75
. This number represents the number of 
shares required for the strategy (# Shares Needed). We then determine the total investment needed by 
multiplying this number by the average share ask price (𝑆𝑡1
𝑎 ) and adding the applicable brokerage 
fees. Using this method we calculate that the total investment required for the 99
th
, 95
th
, and 90
th
 
percentile examples equal: $429,618, $460,188, and $415,153 respectively. Assuming the investor 
maximises his leverage (an LVR of 70%), 70% of this investment will be funded through margin 
lending, while the remainder is funded by their own capital. The resulting totals are produced in Panel 
C of Table XVIII. 
We calculate the resulting returns by discounting all cash flows back to time 𝑡4. As the cash 
dividend and imputation credit are received with absolute certainty, we discount these cash flows 
using the risk-free rate. Our three examples provide excess cash flows of $1,829, $1,847 and $1,427 
in 𝑡4 dollars. We then divide these values by the amount of capital invested by the representative 
investor to calculate the total return on investment, before converting it to a monthly rate based on the 
time-to-maturity. We then subtract the appropriate risk-free rate of interest from this value to 
determine the monthly abnormal returns yielded by each example. Observing the final results in Panel 
D we can see that all three examples provide economically significant, monthly abnormal returns. The 
99
th
, 95
th
, and 90
th
 percentile examples provide monthly abnormal returns of 2.84%, 1.61%, and 
0.86% respectively.   
Based on these findings, we conclude that, even after incorporating explicit transaction costs and 
collateral requirement, the dividend-capturing arbitrage strategy provides significant abnormal 
returns to a small, domestic investor. The evidence therefore supports hypothesis 2.4. 
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 As LEPO contracts are often written on 100 of the underlying shares, a number divisible by 100 is necessary 
to perfectly hedge their position. 
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8. Conclusion 
8.1. Summary 
The market value of a dollar of imputation credits is an important parameter in calculating the 
weighted cost of capital, and in turn, estimating firm value. This thesis uses the simultaneous quotes 
of futures contracts and their underlying shares to draw inferences about the market value placed on a 
dollar of imputation credits, and to determine whether this low value presents significant arbitrage 
opportunities to small domestic investors. We provide a detailed overview of the dividend drop-off 
and simultaneous pricing literature, outlining their deficiencies and inconsistency with the observed 
impact of imputation credits on the cost of equity and firm value.  
We extend the cost-of-carry no-arbitrage framework developed in CFG to more accurately 
estimate the equilibrium futures price. We then apply this iteration of the model to a sample of 2.25 
million observations between FY01 and FY14 to estimate the average market value of cash dividends 
and imputation credits. Our joint-estimate of these two parameters is 0.9451 and 0.0736 respectively. 
Our subsequent results however, demonstrate that the value of imputation credits varies significantly 
over the life of a futures contract, increasing substantially in the days and weeks preceding the ex-
dividend date. Due to the exact timing of these increases – just over 45 days from maturity and in the 
few days before the ex-dividend event – we attribute this result to the activity of both institutional and 
individual dividend-capturers.  
When we limit our sample to a subset of 200,000 observations that have a time-to-maturity of 
greater than six months, we are able to eliminate the activity of these arbitrageurs, and find that the 
value of imputation credits priced into these observations is insignificantly different from zero. This 
suggests that the marginal investor within the futures market varies over time, and that the marginal, 
long-term investor places no value on imputation credits. This is consistent with the theory that in 
‘normal’ times, the marginal long-term providers of equity are foreign, and that the level of 
imputation credits paid out by a firm has no influence over their required return on capital. 
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This conclusion is consistent with another subset of the imputation credits literature, which 
has consistently found that imputation credits have no impact on the cost of capital, or share prices, of 
the firms that pay them. Our result effectively acts to bridge the gap between these two subsets of 
literature by solving the puzzle, regarding why they each produce conflicting results. If our finding 
concludes that dividend-capturing activity presents an upward bias to observed values of theta in 
futures prices, this is an even larger indictment of the estimates produced in the dividend drop-off 
literature. As dividend drop-off studies usually only focus on the few days surrounding the ex-
dividend event, if dividend-capturers influence these prices in the same way that they appear to do in 
the futures market, these studies will produce estimates that are substantially more biased. This would 
partially explain why the estimates of theta in this literature are consistently higher than those 
produced in the simultaneous pricing literature.  
We also present a dividend-capturing arbitrage strategy that has been able to consistently 
produce abnormal returns over our 19 year sample period. We find that even after incorporating 
explicit transaction costs and collateral requirements, a small domestic investor is able to generate 
between 0.86% and 2.83% monthly abnormal returns with the top 10 percent of profitable 
observations in the financial year 2014. While the examples used require a fairly large sum of money 
to engage in the strategy (between $12,000 and $140,000) this is under the assumption that an 
investor wants to receive the maximum $5,000 in imputation credits using one transaction. However, 
an investor with a much smaller amount of capital would actually be able to generate more consistent 
returns using this strategy. As they wouldn’t have the capital to reach $5,000 in imputation credits in 
one transaction, they would be able to undertake the arbitrage strategy multiple times within the same 
year, jumping from one ex-dividend date to another. A strategy of this type would require multiple ex-
dividend events per year, but observing our sample in FY13, there were 10 ex-dividend events 
occurring in separate months, with dividend yields and franking percentages above 2% and 80% 
respectively; all of which had significant liquidity in their respective futures contracts around the time 
of the ex-dividend events. This suggests that this type of strategy is possible, and could be used to 
generate much higher annual returns than those outlined in the three examples. 
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8.2. Limitations and Further Research 
A potential perceived limitation of this thesis is that its findings lack generalizability. Due to 
our sample consisting solely of the largest and most liquid stocks trading on the ASX, critics may 
conclude that foreign ownership in these firms is likely to be higher than their smaller counterparts, 
and they are therefore more susceptible to having a foreign marginal investor, and a lower value of 
theta than would otherwise be the case. The rebuttal to this point is that, theoretically, the level of 
foreign ownership should not affect the equilibrium cost of capital faced by a firm within the market. 
As an example: if the value of imputation credits was partially, or fully, capitalized into the 
stock price of firm A, which is completely owned by domestic long-term investors; then firm B, 
which is entirely foreign owned, and doesn’t incorporate the value of imputation credits, would 
provide significantly higher returns to these same domestic investors, relative to the firm they were 
currently invested in. This higher return reflects the opportunity cost of capital incurred by these 
domestic investors, and would result in them increasingly selling their shares in firm A and buying 
shares in firm B to exploit the higher returns available. While they may not have the buying power to 
increase the value of imputation credits capitalized in the share price of firm B, their initial divestment 
would reduce the supply of capital to firm A, where they actually are marginal. This would result in 
firm A’s cost of capital increasing, and their share price falling, until the domestic long-term investors 
are indifferent between the returns offered by the two firms.  
This demonstrates that foreign investors do not actually have to be the marginal investor in a 
specific firm for them to determine the value of imputation credits. As they are responsible for setting 
the opportunity cost of capital within the market, they are able to influence the returns required of 
domestic investors to such an extent that they can indirectly affect the cost of capital, and firm value, 
of companies they have no direct ownership in. For these reasons we don’t believe the level of foreign 
ownership in our sample actually reduces the generalizability of our key findings.   
A second perceived limitation of this thesis is that – similar to the argument put forward in 
CFG – the marginal investor in the futures market may constantly be a foreign, long-term provider of 
equity, and that imputation credits will only be priced into futures contracts to the extent that foreign 
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investors receive value from their transfer to domestic individuals. We have two arguments that 
suggest this would not be the case. First, dividend-capturers are only active in the market for a 
specific futures contract when it is near to maturity, and only for a short period of time around the ex-
dividend date. It seems unlikely that long-term investors would be focused on ensuring that their 
trades coincide with the time in which arbitrageurs are most active within the market, rather than 
quickly exploiting the perceived under-pricing of shares, or allocating their capital quickly and 
efficiently. Cannavan (2013) argues that long-term providers of equity would be less concerned, and 
less likely to incorporate, the transaction cost differentials when entering into trades. Similarly, it 
seems intuitive that this type of investor would also be less concerned with timing their trades for the 
sake of receiving a tiny percentage of imputation credits
76
, rather than being more concerned about 
firm fundamentals, the time-to-maturity of the contracts, and the timing of more consequential 
macroeconomic conditions.  
Second, our empirical results directly contradict this point. The fact that the value of 
imputation credits priced into futures varies at different time-to-maturities, suggests that the marginal 
investor is changing over time. If imputation credits had a constant positive value, foreign investors 
would incorporate these values into their pricing regardless of their time of purchase, due to the 
certainty that they would be able to transfer these credits at a future date. Our evidence suggests that 
this is not the case.  
While we believe this logic is sound, due to time limitations we were unable to introduce 
additional tests to prove this point definitively. Future research can expand on this paper to develop 
more robust theoretical and empirical evidence to prove that the marginal investor in futures markets 
changes over time. It would be possible to expand on the equilibrium considerations constructed in 
CFG, by incorporating exogenous shocks to the indifference curves of domestic short-term traders 
over time. As a contract nears maturity, the costs associated with dividend-capturing decrease, and the 
potential profitability increases exponentially. This would result in the equivalent of the demand curve 
for futures contracts to shift outward as dividend capturing becomes more attractive, and domestic 
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 Which already present an extremely small return relative to the share price. 
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short-term traders continue to enter the market. If the number of these arbitrageurs entering the market 
is significant enough, they would become the marginal investor, bidding up the value of theta to equal 
the face value of the imputation less the high transaction costs they incur.  
Empirically, this theoretical development could be verified by analysing the market 
microstructure data of which class of investors are actually trading, and setting prices around different 
dates. This would provide additional robustness to our findings, and ensure that the relationship we 
have posited is causal.  
A third perceived limitation is that using a subset of observations that have a time-to-
maturities of greater than six months, increases the level of mispricing in observations, and provides 
an inaccurate estimate of theta. While we do show in Section 7.1.1 that the relative mispricing of 
futures contracts is a function of time-to-maturity, we must note that this measure of 𝑅𝑀𝑃 is 
positively related to the time-to-maturity of an observation. As the costly no-arbitrage formula works 
by attributing any difference in the theoretical and actual futures price to the value of the gross 
dividend, observing a larger level of mispricing would actually result in a larger estimate of the 
market value of cash dividends and imputation credits. Therefore, in the event that our inclusion of a 
control variable for time-to-maturity did not control for this larger mispricing, our regression outputs 
would actually result in an upward bias in the estimate of theta. For the purpose of our conclusions – 
that theta is equal to zero – this fact, if anything, provides a conservative bias to our conclusion. 
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